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I. INTRODUCTION 
Known colloquially as a “muni,” a municipal bond is issued by a 
state or local government as a way of borrowing money.1  The issuing 
governmental entity pays interest on the bond principal to the bond 
owner.2  If the bond meets certain federal requirements,3 then the interest 
 
∗ Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota); Ruth McGregor Chair of 
Teaching Excellence and Visiting Professor, Phoenix School of Law (2009-2010); Commissioner, 
Navajo Tax Commission, Navajo Nation (Arizona, New Mexico, Utah); Commissioner, Tesuque 
Tax Commission, Tesuque Pueblo (New Mexico); Associate Justice, Court of Appeals, Prairie 
Island Indian Community (Minnesota). 
 1. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENT TERMS 439 (7th ed. 2006). 
 2. Kevin M. Yamamoto, A Proposal for the Elimination of the Exclusion for State Bond 
Interest, 50 FLA. L. REV. 145, 153 (1998). A bond may be issued with no interest or at a rate of 
interest that is too low for the market.  These bonds are issued at a discount.  This original issue 
discount is a form of unstated interest.  For example, a $100,000 bond may be issued at no interest 
payable in one year.  An investor may be willing to pay $96,000 for such a bond and then collect 
$100,000 on the date of its maturity one year from issue.  Such a bond has original issue discount of 
$4,000, which, in effect, is $4,000 of unstated interest.  See Calvin H. Johnson, A Thermometer for 
the Tax System: The Overall Health of the Tax System as Measured by Implicit Tax, 56 SMU L. 
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income that the bond owner receives is excluded from gross income and, 
as a result, is not subject to the federal income tax.4  This exemption 
from the federal income tax is an important feature of the bond, because 
investors are willing to accept a lower interest rate on a municipal bond 
than on a bond with fully taxable interest.5  The bond owner looks at the 
after-tax yield as an important factor in determining if the municipal 
bond is a good investment.6 
For example, suppose T, an individual investor who is in the 30 
percent federal income tax bracket, has a choice between a $100,000 
New York City municipal bond paying 8 percent interest per year for 20 
years or a $100,000 General Electric (GE) bond paying 10 percent 
interest per year for 20 years.  The municipal bond pays $8,000 interest 
per year, and the GE bond pays $10,000 per year.  Assuming equivalent 
credit worthiness for the two borrowers and ignoring the federal income 
tax consequences, the GE bond provides T with $2,000 more in interest 
income and, therefore, generates a better yield.  But once we factor in 
the federal income tax, the difference in after-tax yield for the two bonds 
shows that the municipal bond is T’s better investment.  T would pay no 
federal income tax on the $8,000 in interest from the municipal bond, 
but T would have to pay $3,000 in federal income tax on the $10,000 in 
interest from the GE bond (interest of $10,000 x 30 percent federal 
income tax rate is $3,000 in federal income tax).  T’s after-tax yield on 
the GE bond would be $7,000 per year ($10,000 in interest less $3,000 
in federal income tax).  The after-tax yield for the GE bond is 7 percent 
compared to the 8 percent yield on the municipal bond.  All things 
considered, the municipal bond is the better investment for T and 
provides $1,000 more in after-tax income than the GE bond.7 
 
REV.  41 n.43 (2003).  The municipal bond market, however, usually involves bonds that mature a 
substantial number of years in the future.  As a result, the stated interest rate is usually close to the 
actual interest rate when taking original issue discount into account. 
 3. For general revenue bonds of state and local governments, the requirements involve 
arbitrage restrictions and registration requirements.  See I.R.C. §§ 148-149 (2006). 
 4. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006).  In addition, state and local governments also issue private 
activity bonds used to fund private projects of governmental interest. Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 
159-60.  These bonds are subject to more rules and restrictions.  See I.R.C. §§ 141-147 (2006). 
 5. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1805 (2008). 
 6. See id.  But see Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 175 (arguing that the investor, not the state or 
local government, is capturing most of the tax subsidy by receiving higher yields than one would 
expect taking into account the tax-exempt status of the interest income). 
 7. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 39 (arguing that bonds issued by the federal government 
should be used in making comparisons because the level of risk is similar). 
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This federal tax exemption operates as an indirect federal subsidy 
to state and local governments.8  If the federal government foregoes 
income tax revenue on the interest income that a municipal bond 
generates, then state and local governments can pay lower rates of 
interest on the money they borrow.9  The above example illustrates how 
this works: the investor gets a better after-tax rate of return, the city pays 
a lower rate of interest, and the federal government does not collect any 
federal income tax on the interest income that T earns from the 
municipal bond.  The magnitude of this indirect federal subsidy, which 
is known as a tax expenditure, is approximately $35 billion per year for 
the period 2006 to 2012.10 
In 1983, Congress decided that federally recognized Indian tribes, 
which have many of the infrastructure needs of state and local 
governments, should enjoy a comparable federal income tax exemption 
for their tribal bonds.11  Congress made the assumption that federal tax-
exempt status for tribal bonds would lower the borrowing costs of tribes 
in the same way that it does for state and local governments.12  The 
lower costs of borrowing for tribes would free up more money for tribal 
projects.  For example, if the Navajo Nation issued tribal bonds at 7 
percent interest, and if an individual investor bought one of these bonds 
with a principal of $100,000, then the bond owner’s annual interest of 
$7,000 would not be subject to the federal income tax because of the rule 
that excludes the $7,000 from gross income.13  This is a thumbnail 
sketch of the federal income taxation of interest paid on bonds issued by 
state, local, and tribal governments.   
 
 8. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 155. 
 9. See id. at 148. 
 10. See Domestic Sports Stadiums: Do They Divert Funds From Critical Public 
Infrastructure? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy on Tax Exempt Bond Financing 
of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (Testimony of Eric 
Solomon, Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy), 9, available at 
http://domesticpolicy.oversight.house.gov/documents/20071010171553.pdf (indicating a tax 
expenditure of $30.9 billion for 2006 growing to $41.1 billion in 2012). 
 11. See I.R.C. § 7871(a)(4) (2006) (enacted as part of the Indian Tribal Tax Status Act of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97, 473, § 202, 96 Stat. 2607, 2608 (1983)).  For an overview of the legislative 
history of this provision, see Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax 
Legislative Process, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 341-48 (1994) (focusing on the restriction that 
prohibited tribes from issuing private activity bonds).    
 12. See Aprill, supra note 11, at 343 n.57 (summarizing congressional testimony indicating 
need for tax-exempt bonds). 
 13. See id. at 348 (criticizing Congress for not allowing tribes to issue private activity bonds 
because tribes generally lack the tax base that is necessary to issue general revenue bonds).  
3
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State income taxation of interest on a municipal bond is a little 
different.  States, like the federal government,14 have the power to tax,15 
and most states have an income tax.16  State income tax rates tend to be 
much lower than the federal rates.17  Therefore, the question of state 
income tax exemption for interest on state, local, and tribal bonds 
involves a lower order of magnitude than the federal exemption.18  
Nonetheless, all the states with an income tax, except Indiana,19 have 
enacted legislation that extends the exemption, but only to their own 
bonds.20  As a result, almost all the states with an income tax impose 
their tax on interest earned on out-of-state bonds.21  
This in-state preference annoyed two taxpayers from Kentucky.22  
George and Catherine Davis owned some out-of-state municipal bonds 
that paid them interest, and Kentucky imposed its income tax on this 
interest income.23  The taxpayers challenged the state’s power to 
discriminate in favor of in-state bonds.24  The taxpayers asserted that 
Kentucky’s discriminatory form of taxation violated the Dormant 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.25  The text of the 
Constitution merely grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”26  The United States Supreme Court, however, has interpreted 
the Commerce Clause text as having a negative implication in instances 
 
 14. The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to tax.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 1. 
 15. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976) (noting that the proposed constitution, with the exception of duties on imports and exports, 
allowed the states to retain their power to tax “in the most absolute and unqualified sense.” Id.).  
 16. The nine states without an income tax are: Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming.  See Internal Revenue Service, States 
Without a State Tax (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/efile/article/0,,id=130684,00.html.  
 17. See Federation of Tax Administrators, State Individual Income Taxes (2008) (on file with 
author), available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/ind_inc.pdf (with tops rates ranging from 
4.54 percent for Arizona to 9.5 percent for Vermont).  
 18. See I.R.C. § 1(i) (2006) (providing a top marginal tax rate of 35 percent on federal taxable 
income of individuals).  
 19. Indiana is the only state with an income tax that provides an exemption for all state and 
local bonds.  See IND. CODE § 6-3-1-3.5 (2008).  Utah provides an exemption for state and local out-
of-state bonds if the sister state exempts Utah bonds.  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-114(1)(g), (6) 
(2008). 
 20. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1806 n.6 (2008). 
 21. Id. at 1804. 
 22. Id. at 1807. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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when Congress has not undertaken any direct regulation.27  Now referred 
to as the “dormant” Commerce Clause, the Court’s body of case law 
provides a broad prohibition against state laws that discriminate against 
interstate commerce.28  Over the years, the Court’s Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence has developed some refinements, including an 
exception for state or local laws that further a legitimate governmental 
interest apart from economic protectionism.29      
In the Kentucky case, the Supreme Court concluded that the public 
finance needs of state and local governments justified the state’s income 
tax discrimination in favor of its own state and local bonds.30  
Accordingly, the state income tax on the interest of out-of-state 
municipal bonds did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause and 
was, therefore, constitutional.  The Davis case did not involve the state 
income taxation of tribal bonds.  Consequently, a state’s power to tax 
interest on tribal bonds remains an open question for those 42 states with 
an income tax and an exemption limited to in-state bonds.31  At least one 
state has a provision dealing with tribal bonds, but most do not.32  
Certainly, some states will assert that their income tax applies to interest 
their residents earn on tribal bonds.  An added variable is that some 
states have tribes within their boundaries, making these tribal bonds 
arguably the equivalent to in-state bonds.33   
In this article, I use the Davis case as the point of departure for a 
critical analytical discussion of a state’s power to impose its income tax 
on tribal bond interest.  In general, I conclude that states do not have the 
 
 27. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at 1808-09. 
 30. See id. at 1810. 
 31. For a list of these states, see id. at 1807 n.7. 
 32. See MINN. STAT. § 290.01(19a)(1)(iii) (2008).  This statute provides that for purposes of 
determining Minnesota’s income tax exemption for in-state bonds “interest on obligations of an 
Indian tribal government described in section 7871(c) of the Internal Revenue Code shall be treated 
as interest income on obligations of the state in which the tribe is located.”  This provision has the 
effect of imposing the Minnesota income tax on all interest income earned by Minnesota taxpayer 
on tribal bonds issued by tribes located outside of Minnesota.  In addition, interest income earned on 
tribal bonds issued by one of the eleven federally recognized Indian tribes located within Minnesota 
would be treated the same as interest earned on in-state bonds. California considered enacting such 
a provision.  See Gail Hall, Analysis of Original Bill (SB 995): Exemption/Interest On Bonds Issued 
By Federally Recognized Indian Tribal Government Located Within This State (Franchise Tax 
Board, Feb. 22, 2005), available at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/legis/05_06bills/sb995_022205.pdf 
(copy on file with author) (providing an analysis of a proposed bill to grant tax exemption for 
purposes of the California income tax for interest earned by California taxpayers owning a tribal 
bond issued by a federally recognized Indian tribe located within California).  California never 
amended its income tax law to provide an exemption for interest earned on tribal bonds. 
 33. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, ATLAS OF AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS 42 (1990). 
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power to tax this interest for three independent reasons.  First, the federal 
regulation of tribal bonds is so pervasive that it preempts state taxation 
under the Indian preemption doctrine.  Second, state taxation of tribal 
bond interest adversely affects tribal resources and, therefore, impairs 
and infringes tribal sovereignty so substantially that the state power to 
tax is rendered invalid.  Finally, the Indian Commerce Clause, as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, prohibits discriminatory 
state taxation when it involves transactions closely connected to tribes 
and to Indian country.  These three independent barriers to state income 
taxation of tribal bond interest apply whether the tribe issuing the bond 
is located within the state or in another state.  Arguably, denial of an 
exemption for interest from a tribal bond issued by a tribe within a state 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it is based on a racial category that does not survive strict 
scrutiny.  I conclude, however, that federally recognized Indian tribes 
are distinct political entities under our constitutional framework and that 
their special status is political, not racial.  Accordingly, states, based on 
revenue needs and their legitimate interest in funding their own 
governmental projects, have a rational purpose sufficient to survive 
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 
In order to provide the fullest consideration of these very 
complicated issues, I have divided my discussion into six parts.  In the 
first part, I discuss specific state statutes to show how their application to 
the state income taxation of interest on tribal bonds is textually unclear.  
The primary purpose of this part of the discussion is to show that the 
analysis must start with the particular state income tax statute itself to 
see if it purports to tax the interest income generated by a tribal bond.  In 
some instances, the more reasonable interpretation of the state statute 
may lead to the conclusion that the statute does not impose a tax on the 
interest from the tribal bond.  None of the relevant statutes contains an 
explicit exemption for tribal bonds, although California has proposed 
one that it has yet to adopt.34 
In Part II, I explore the special treatment of federally recognized 
Indian tribes and the broad exemption they enjoy from state taxation 
when the legal incidence of a state tax falls on the tribe for activities that 
take place wholly or primarily within the tribe’s reservation.  I conclude 
that the legal incidence of the state income tax falls on the bond owner, 
not the tribe.  As a result, tribal immunity from state taxation does not 
extend to the interest it pays on tribal bonds and therefore, this immunity 
 
 34. See id. 
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by itself does not bar state income taxation of the interest from the tribal 
bond.  In Part III, I investigate the application of the Indian preemption 
doctrine and conclude that the federal statutes, regulations, and 
administrative authority dealing with tribal bonds so occupy the field 
that the state’s power to tax tribal bond interest is preempted.  The 
discussion in Part IV explores whether a state income tax on tribal bond 
interest impermissibly infringes tribal sovereignty.  The current Supreme 
Court has paid little attention to state infringement of tribal sovereignty 
and needs to develop meaningful standards for limiting state 
encroachment on tribal sovereignty.  A state’s taxing power is a good 
starting place, especially when this power directly impedes a tribe in its 
exercise of an essential governmental function.  In Part V, I discuss 
application of the Indian Commerce Clause.  Supreme Court 
jurisprudence is in its infancy on this question and should expand to 
impose a constitutional barrier against states whose taxes discriminate 
against tribes.  Finally, in Part VI, I discuss whether states that 
discriminate against tribes within their borders are engaging in 
unconstitutional racial discrimination.  I conclude that the discrimination 
is political, not racial, and, therefore, does not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
II. ANALYTICAL BEGINNING 
When dealing with state taxation of transactions involving Indian 
country, the analysis should always start with the state statute and other 
sources of state law.  This analytical beginning ensures that the best 
answers to state law questions come from the state law itself.  The 
administration of state tax law is in the hands of state tax administrators.  
If their state’s tax law, regulations, constitution, or administrative 
interpretations provide an answer that is favorable to the taxpayer, then 
reliance on federal law becomes unnecessary.  Moreover, federal law, 
especially federal Indian law, is often unfamiliar to the state tax 
administrator.  It is safe to assume that a state official does not like being 
told that state law is invalid because of federal law.  If there is room for 
argument, then the state tax administrator may, by nature, adopt the 
opposing point of view.  In contrast, if the source of law is state law, 
then the state tax administrator is more likely to accept it as a rationale 
for not taxing the interest on a tribal bond. 
In the case of interest from tribal bonds, the text of each individual 
state income tax statute requires close reading.  Of the 50 states, 41 have 
7
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an income tax.35  The District of Columbia (D.C.) also has an income 
tax.36  Of these 42 jurisdictions (41 states and D.C.), only Indiana has a 
provision that allows an exemption from its income tax for interest on 
bonds from Indiana and from all other states.37  And even in Indiana’s 
case, the exemption is by no means explicit as applied to tribal bonds.  
Instead, the Indiana exemption requires application of a state statute that 
refers to the Internal Revenue Code,38 arguably the most complicated 
statute ever written.  If someone had to explain Indiana’s income tax 
exemption for interest on tribal bonds by reference to a specific statute, 
it would be difficult.  Instead, the exemption in Indiana arises because its 
state income tax adopts federal adjusted gross income as the starting 
point for its tax.39  The Indiana modifications to this definition do not 
require an adjustment for interest income earned on out-of-state bonds or 
on tribal bonds.40  Federal adjusted gross income under the federal 
income tax does not include interest on state and local bonds.41  Certain 
tribal bonds are defined as state and local bonds for federal income tax 
purposes.42  As a result, the income from these tribal bonds is not 
included in federal adjusted gross income and, accordingly, is not part of 
income for purposes of Indiana’s state income tax.43 
Most of the other states with an income tax initially define income, 
as does Indiana, by reference to federal adjusted gross income or taxable 
income.44  These states, however, then make certain additions to 
 
 35. The nine states without an income tax are: Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming.  See Internal Revenue Service, States 
Without a State Income Tax (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/efile/ 
article/0,,id=130684,00.html.  
 36. See D.C. CODE § 47-1806.01 (2008). 
 37. Actually, the Indiana income tax defines its tax base as the federal adjusted gross income 
of the taxpayer with no adjustments for the federal exclusion for interest on state, local and tribal 
bonds.  As a result, the federal exclusion is incorporated into Indiana’s definition of its tax base.  
See IND. CODE § 6-3-1-3.5 (2008).  See also Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 
1807 n.7 (2008). 
 38. See I.R.C. §§ 1 – 9833 (2006). 
 39. See IND. CODE § 6-3-1-3.5 (2008). 
 40. See id. 
 41. I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 42. I.R.C. § 7871 (2006).  Congress recently amended § 7871 to allow tribes to issue private 
activity bonds on a limited basis.  See I.R.C. § 7871(f) added by § 1402 of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1402, 123 Stat. 115, 1402. 
 43. See Scott A. Taylor, An Introduction and Overview of Taxation and Indian Gaming, 29 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 251, 260 (1997). 
 44. See Michael Mazerov, Dan R. Bucks & Multistate Tax Commission, Federal Tax 
Restructuring and State and Local Governments: An Introduction to the Issues and the Literature, 
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1459, 1470 (1996).  
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income,45 including interest on state and local bonds from other states.46  
This addition has the effect of removing the exemption and subjecting 
the interest income from out-of-state bonds to the in-state income tax. 
Kentucky, which was the state involved in the Davis case, is a good 
example of how this works.  Kentucky defines its “adjusted gross 
income” as federal adjusted gross income subject to Kentucky’s own list 
of subtractions and additions.47  One of these additions is “interest 
income derived from obligations of sister states and political 
subdivisions thereof.”48   Kentucky’s adjusted gross income is further 
reduced by deductions to arrive at “net income,”49 which is then the tax 
base on which Kentucky’s income tax is applied.  The effect is to 
preserve the exemption for interest on in-state bonds while removing the 
exemption for out-of-state bonds.  What about tribal bonds? 
The text of the Kentucky statute is “obligations of sister states and 
political subdivisions thereof.”50  This language makes no specific 
reference to tribal bonds.  As a result, a Kentucky taxpayer who owns a 
$100,000 Navajo Nation bond earning $7,000 in interest each year 
legitimately could argue that this $7,000 of interest income is exempt 
from the Kentucky income tax.  The taxpayer’s argument is fairly 
logical.  The federal income tax defines a tribal bond as being a state or 
local bond.51  The federal statute that excludes municipal bond interest 
income from the bond owner’s federal gross income also excludes the 
interest income from the Navajo bond, because it is treated the same as a 
state or local bond for federal income tax purposes.52  As a result, the 
Navajo bond owner’s federal adjusted gross income does not include the 
interest from the Navajo bond.  Kentucky’s definition of its adjusted 
gross income incorporates the federal definition of adjusted gross 
income.53  The Kentucky adjustment that adds municipal bond interest 
back into Kentucky adjusted gross income extends only to an “obligation 
of a sister state.”54  If the Navajo Nation is not a sister state, then the 
 
 45. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 290.01(19) (2008) (defining Minnesota net income as federal 
taxable income as defined in I.R.C. § 63 (2006)). 
 46. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 290.01(19a)(1)(i) (2008) (adding “interest income on obligations 
of any state other than Minnesota” that is otherwise exempt under federal income tax law).  
 47. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10) (West 2008). 
 48. See id at § 141.010(10)(c). 
 49. See id. at § 141.010(11). 
 50. See id at § 141.010(10)(c). 
 51. See I.R.C. § 7871(a)(4) (2006). 
 52. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 53. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10) (West 2008). 
 54. See id. at § 1.41.010(10)(c). 
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Navajo Nation bond is not an “obligation of a sister state” for purposes 
of the Kentucky statute.  Accordingly, the interest income paid to the 
Kentucky taxpayer who owns the Navajo bond need not be added back 
into Kentucky adjusted gross income under this line of argument. 
Kentucky, however, may very well argue that the Navajo Nation is 
a sister state under its statute.  If Kentucky takes this position, then the 
question becomes whether a federally recognized Indian tribe is a “sister 
state” for purposes of the Kentucky statute.  The Kentucky statute itself 
provides no definition of “sister state” or Indian tribe.  The state tax 
authorities in Kentucky are working on a fairly clean slate.  And the state 
courts would not have much to go on.  Therefore, Kentucky might turn 
to federal law for guidance.  The most relevant place to start would be 
section 7871(a)(4) in the Internal Revenue Code.  This section treats 
tribal bonds the same as state and local bonds by saying that an “Indian 
tribal government shall be treated as a State . . . for purposes of Section 
103 (relating to State and local bonds).”55  Section 103 of the Internal 
Revenue Code provides the exclusion from gross income for interest 
earned on state and local bonds.  And it is the effect of Section 103 that 
caused Kentucky to require the addition of interest from bonds of sister 
states.  Whether these federal statutes are sufficient to transform the 
Navajo Nation into a sister state for purposes of the Kentucky statute is 
entirely unclear.  The federal statute, however, does provide Kentucky 
with an argument that the Navajo Nation should be treated the same as 
other states, at least for this limited purpose of imposing Kentucky’s 
income tax.  Ultimately, Kentucky tax authorities have the initial 
responsibility for interpreting Kentucky tax law.  My guess is that they 
will treat the Navajo Nation bond the same as a bond from New York.56   
A number of other states use language similar to Kentucky’s 
statute, which starts with the federal definition of taxable income, but 
then adds back interest earned on out-of-state bonds.  New York and 
Montana  are good examples.  New York’s add-back language applies to 
“interest income on obligations of any state other than this state . . . .”57  
The add-back language is limited to states (and their political 
subdivisions).  Therefore, it arguably does not extend to tribes.  Montana 
adopts similar language, but actually adds back all interest from all states 
 
 55. I.R.C. § 7871(a)(4) (2006). 
 56. Kentucky has no federally recognized Indian tribes within its borders.  Therefore, 
consideration of the treatment of in-state tribal bonds for Kentucky is irrelevant. See PRUCHA, supra 
note 33, at 42. 
 57. See N.Y. TAX  LAW § 612(b)(1) (McKinney 2006). 
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and then excludes obligations of Montana.58  For states with statutes like 
Kentucky, New York, or Montana, the state income taxation of interest 
on tribal bonds is unclear and requires statutory interpretation.  
Other states follow the Kentucky approach, but they use 
substantially different language in defining the bonds whose interest is 
subject to taxation.  Arizona is a good example.  Its statute applies to 
“obligations of any state, territory or possession of the United States, or 
any political subdivision thereof, located outside the state of Arizona.”59  
The Arizona language is more expansive and applies to territories and 
possessions of the United States together with their political 
subdivisions.  This language could extend to Indian tribes if they are 
viewed as territories or possessions of the United States.  Arizona case 
law suggests that the state courts do not view tribes as territories or 
possessions.60  Other states, in other legal contexts, have viewed tribes as 
having the same legal status as a territory.61  This ambiguity in the 
statutory language means that the treatment of interest on tribal bonds is 
unclear.  An additional complication in the Arizona language is that it 
could be construed as allowing an exemption for tribes located within 
Arizona.  Arizona has federally recognized tribes wholly or partly within 
its boundaries.62  Accordingly, the “outside the state of Arizona” 
language may mean that only those tribes outside of the state are covered 
by the special provision.  
The statutory rules for Arkansas provide a clear case in which the 
state income tax will apply to interest paid on tribal bonds.  Gross 
income is broadly defined and includes interest income.63  Specifically 
excluded from gross income is any interest earned on “obligations of the 
State of Arkansas or any political subdivision.”64  Under this statutory 
framework, interest on a tribal bond is included within the generic 
definition of “interest” but not subject to a specific exclusion that applies 
only to in-state bonds.  Accordingly, the tribal interest would be subject 
to the Arkansas income tax.  Alabama uses a statutory approach that is 
 
 58. See MONT. CODE ANN.§ 15-30-2110(1)(a)(i) (2009) (adding back “interest received on 
obligations of another state”).  
 59. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1021(3) (2008). 
 60. See Scott A. Taylor, Enforcement of Tribal Court Tax Judgments Outside of Indian 
Country: The Ways and Means, 34 N.M. L. REV. 339, 358-59 (2004). 
 61. See id. at 361-62. 
 62. See PRUCHA, supra note 33, at 42. 
 63. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-404(a)(1)(D) (2009).  
 64. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-404(b)(5) (2009). 
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similar to Arkansas relying first on a broad rule of inclusion65 and then 
providing a narrow rule of exclusion for in-state bonds.66 
Colorado takes yet another approach.  Starting with the federal 
definition of taxable income, it adds back all interest income excluded 
by federal law, except for interest earned on in-state bonds.67  This 
approach clearly subjects interest on tribal bonds to the Colorado income 
tax.  Those states following the Colorado approach include Delaware,68 
Georgia,69 and Idaho.70 
The important point here is that the precise language varies for each 
state statute dealing with the income tax treatment of interest on bonds 
exempt under the Internal Revenue Code.  In some states, the taxpayer 
has a good argument that the text of the state income tax law actually 
exempts interest on tribal bonds.  In other states, the text seems 
unambiguous and extends taxation to tribal bonds.  Taxpayers who own 
tribal bonds should carefully read the state statute dealing with their 
state’s income taxation of interest on bonds that are exempt from the 
federal income tax. 
III. STATE TAXATION OF FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBES 
As a general proposition, states cannot tax tribes for activities that 
tribes undertake within their own reservations.71  If a tribe engages in 
activity off its reservation, then a state is free to tax that activity unless 
Congress restricts the state power.72  In addition, a state can tax a non-
member, non-Indian on transactions on or off the reservation involving a 
tribe or its members unless Congress restricts the state power.73  These 
 
 65. See ALA. CODE § 40-18-4 (2009). 
 66. See ALA. CODE § 40-18-14(3)(f) (2009). 
 67. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-104(3)(b) (2009). 
 68. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1106(a)(1) (2009).  
 69. See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-27(b)(1)(A) (2009). 
 70. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3022M(1), (3)(b) (2009). 
 71. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 459 (1995) (holding that 
where “the legal incidence of an excise tax rests on a tribe . . . for sales made inside Indian country, 
the tax cannot be enforced absent clear congressional authorization.”); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (“In the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction 
or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian 
reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within reservation boundaries.”). 
 72. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 149 (concluding that the State of New Mexico 
“retained the right to tax, unless Congress forbade it, all Indian land and Indian activities located or 
occurring” outside of the tribe’s reservation). 
 73. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (allowing the 
imposition of a state fuel excise tax on off-reservation sales by non-Indian wholesalers to a tribe that 
owned and operated a gas station within its own reservation); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New 
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (allowing the imposition of a state severance tax on the extraction of 
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three rules seem relatively simple.  Unfortunately, their application is 
often difficult because deciding on whom the tax falls is difficult74 and 
because locating the transactions on or off the reservation depends on all 
the facts and circumstances.75  In addition, Congress rarely provides an 
explicit rule preempting state taxation.76  
A. Tribal Immunity from State Taxation 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a tribe is 
immune from state taxation for activities undertaken within its own 
reservation.  The Court first acknowledged77 this principle of immunity 
in 1973 when it decided Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones.78  The issue 
in Mescalero was New Mexico’s power to impose its gross receipts tax 
on the tribe’s sale of goods and services79 in connection with the 
operation of a ski resort located just outside the reservation boundary.80  
The Court permitted the imposition of the state tax because the activity 
 
oil and gas produced by a non-Indian lessee of the tribe on tribal lands but sold to buyers located off 
the reservation); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) (allowing the imposition of a territorial tax 
imposed on cattle owned by non-Indians where the cattle were located on the reservation under 
grazing leases entered into with the tribe). 
 74. See, e.g., Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 101-5 (discussing the arguments about legal incidence, 
including those made by the United States as amicus curiae in favor of the tribe, which the Court 
rejected); Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 461 (noting that that the state tax statute in question did 
“not expressly identify who bears the tax’s legal incidence” thereby requiring the Court in “the 
absence of such dispositive language” to undertake a fair interpretation of the statute). 
 75. See Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1980) (finding 
that a sale to a tribe by a non-resident, non-Indian vendor was preempted by the federal Indian 
Trader Statute because the transaction was primarily located within the reservation).  Justice 
Stewart’s dissent in Central Machinery shows that a minority of the Court believed that the business 
location of the vendor was an important factor that should have allowed the state to impose a tax on 
the transaction.  Id. at 169-70. 
 76. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 839-40 (1982) 
(involving consideration of the four different pieces of federal legislation, none of which contained 
a specific provision dealing with federal preemption of state taxation); White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145-46 (1980) (involving federal legislation and regulation dealing 
with the sale of timber located on Indian lands); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 
380 U.S. 685, 688-89 (1965) (involving federal legislation that regulated Indian traders). 
 77. Arguably, the United State Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 
(1898), raised the issue by negative implication.  The case involved a tax imposed by the Territory 
of Oklahoma on cattle owned by non-Indians.  Id. at 268.  The cattle owners entered into grazing 
leases with the Osage and Kansas Indians, and the cattle being taxed were on Indians lands.  Id. at 
272-73.  The Court found that “a tax put upon the cattle of the lessees is too remote to be deemed a 
tax upon the lands or privileges of the Indians.”  Id. at 273.  This quote implies that a direct tax on 
the tribe would have been invalid. 
 78. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (indicating that states cannot 
tax tribes or their members for on-reservation activity unless Congress provides authorization). 
 79. See id. at 146-47. 
 80. See id. at 146. 
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was located off the reservation81 and because no federal statute restricted 
the state’s power to tax.82 
The Court’s opinion, written by Justice White, said virtually 
nothing about the underlying basis of the general principle that a tribe is 
immune from state taxation on activity within its reservation.83  Instead, 
Justice White spent considerable time rejecting the theory that a tribe is 
an instrumentality of the federal government.84  Under this theory, the 
tribe would have enjoyed immunity from state taxation whether its 
activity was on or off the reservation.85  The only whiff of a rationale 
that Justice White offered was his citation to McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Commission.86  Justice White’s reliance on McClanahan was 
entirely misplaced because that case did not involve state taxation of the 
tribe.  He failed to recognize that members of the tribe are individuals 
who are distinct from the tribe, which is a political entity.  He has left us 
with a rule devoid of a rationale.  The dissent of Justice Douglas in 
Mescalero added nothing to the rationale justifying on-reservation 
immunity for the tribe.87 
The Court did not address a tribe’s immunity from state taxation 
again until 1995 in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation.88  
The case involved Oklahoma’s attempt to impose its state tax on motor 
fuels sold on the reservation at a gas station owned and operated by the 
Chickasaw Nation.89  Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Court 
and merely stated that existing Supreme Court case law90 required a 
 
 81. See id. at 148-49. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973). 
 84. See id. at 150-55. 
 85. See id. at 150 (rejecting the assertion that the ski resort was a federal instrumentality and 
immune from state taxation even though it was located off the reservation). 
 86. See id. at 148 (observing that the McClanahan case “lays to rest any doubt in this respect 
by holding that [state taxation of Indian lands or income] . . . is not permissible absent congressional 
consent.”).  McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), was decided the 
same day as Mescalero and involved Arizona’s attempt to impose its income tax on a member of the 
Navajo Nation who lived on the reservation and who worked for the tribe.  Id. at 165-66. 
 87. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 159-63 (arguing that the federal legislation 
permitting the tribe’s building of the ski resort preempted the state’s power to tax). 
 88. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
 89. See id. at 452-53.  The case also involved the question of whether Oklahoma could 
impose its income tax on tribal members who worked for the tribe but who lived off the reservation.  
On this issue, the Court held in favor of Oklahoma.  See id. at 462-67. 
 90. See id. at 458 (citing two cases to support Justice Ginsberg’s conclusion that a tribe is 
immune from state taxation, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) and McClanahan v. Ariz. 
State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), even though both cases dealt with state taxation of 
individual tribal members).  Justice Ginsburg, like Justice White, seems to equate tribal members 
with the political entity of the tribe.   
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categorical approach to state taxation of the tribe, which meant that 
Oklahoma could not impose its tax on gasoline sold by the Chickasaw 
Nation at its gas station located on its reservation.91  Oklahoma had 
unsuccessfully urged that the Court should balance the federal, state, and 
tribal interests before deciding whether the state tax was justified.92  
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion provided no underlying rationale for the 
Chickasaw Nation’s immunity.  She merely observed that the immunity 
is a preexisting condition that Congress can modify.93   
Justice Ginsburg did add one refinement to the analysis: legal 
incidence.  I discuss legal incidence more fully in the next section.  The 
point here, after Justice Ginsburg’s refinement, is that a tribe is not 
immune from a state tax unless its legal incidence falls on the tribe.  For 
purposes of a tribe’s immunity from state taxation, the economic 
incidence or burden of the tax is no longer relevant.  A tribe enjoys 
immunity from the state tax only if the legal incidence of the tax falls on 
the tribe.94  The legal incidence refinement that Justice Ginsburg added 
to the mix provides no help in understanding the rationale behind the 
general rule.  Instead, the rule is now just more complicated: a tribe is 
immune from state taxation when the legal incidence of the tax falls on 
the tribe and when the activity takes place on the reservation, unless 
Congress otherwise authorizes the tax. 
The first United States Supreme Court case in which a state was 
permitted to tax a tribe was Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of 
Chippewa Indians.95  In Leech Lake, a large percentage of the lands 
within the tribe’s reservation had been allotted and sold to non-Indians 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.96  During the 
1980s, the Leech Lake Band began buying private lands within its 
reservation when these lands went up for sale.97  In the early 1990s, Cass 
County began imposing its property tax on these parcels.98  The County 
argued that Congress had authorized the imposition of the local property 
tax through various federal statutes.99  The Court, in an opinion written 
 
 91. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995). 
 92. See id. at 457-58. 
 93. See id. at 457. 
 94. See id. at 458-59. 
 95. See Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998). 
 96. See id. at 106.  In 1977, the tribe and its members owned only 5 percent of the lands 
within the reservation boundaries.  See id. at 108. 
 97. See id. at 108. 
 98. See id. at 108. 
 99. See Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 109 (1998). 
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by Justice Thomas, concluded that the County was correct.100  His 
reasoning reaffirmed the requirement that state taxation of tribal lands 
was permitted only if Congress had made its intention to permit such 
taxation “unmistakably clear.”101  Justice Thomas articulated the 
appropriate standard, but he failed to see that Congress did not authorize 
state property taxation within the narrow facts of this case when the 
Leech Lake Band owned the land within its own reservation 
boundaries.102  In any case, Leech Lake reaffirmed the principle that a 
state cannot tax a tribe’s reservation lands unless Congress authorizes 
such taxation in legislation that makes this unmistakably clear.  Finally, 
the opinion provided no rationale for the general rule that a tribe is 
immune from state taxation for on-reservation activity. 
The other Supreme Court case in this area is City of Sherrill v. 
Oneida Indian Nation.103  In City of Sherrill, local property taxation was 
once again the issue.  In this case, the Oneida Indian Nation purchased 
properties within the boundaries of the City of Sherrill in New York.104  
The lands were within the tribe’s 300,000 acre reservation that continues 
to be the subject of an ongoing land claim in which the Oneida Nation 
asserts that its title was wrongfully terminated by the State of New York 
starting in the 1790s in violation of federal law.105  The Supreme Court 
previously confirmed these claims.106  The Oneida Nation’s argument in 
its property tax case was simple.  The lands owned by the tribe were 
located within its historic reservation, and final settlement of those 
claims was still pending.107  The Oneida Nation asserted that it should be 
free from the local property tax unless the City of Sherrill could point to 
a specific federal statute authorizing the tax.108  The Court, in an opinion 
written by Justice Ginsburg, found that the tribe had no immunity 
because its sovereignty over the lands in question had terminated, even 
 
 100. See id. at 113.  
 101. See id. at 110. 
 102. See Scott A. Taylor, State Property Taxation of Tribal Fee Lands Located Within 
Reservation Boundaries: Reconsidering County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation and Leech Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 23 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 55, 92-95 (1998/99) (explaining how Congress has never authorized state taxation of lands 
owned by a tribe within its own reservation even when tribal ownership is reacquired following a 
period when the lands were taxable when not owned by the tribe).   
 103. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
 104. See id. at 202. 
 105. See id. at 204-05. 
 106. See id. at 208-09. 
 107. See id. at 213. 
 108. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 213-14 (2005). 
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though its claims for relief were still very much alive.109  In substance, 
Justice Ginsburg relied on a “laches” line of reasoning that essentially 
penalized the Oneida Nation for not making a timely claim of 
sovereignty over the disputed lands.110  Of greater interest for purposes 
of this article, Justice Ginsburg added nothing to the still blank slate on 
the rationale for tribal immunity from state taxation.111 
The Court has had opportunities in these four cases to explain its 
rationale for tribal tax immunity.  The Court has neglected to provide a 
rationale.  Given its next opportunity, the Court should adopt a rationale 
for its immunity rule.  I propose this rationale: 
State taxation of a federally recognized Indian tribe destroys the 
tribe’s political integrity and sovereignty, which the United States, 
through treaties, agreements, and legislation, has promised to preserve 
and to protect.  The aboriginal sovereignty of every federally 
recognized Indian tribe includes immunity from state taxation, which 
can be imposed only if authorized by treaty, granted through separate 
consent of the tribe, or allowed by federal legislation. 
Justice White, when referring to a tribe’s power to tax, outlined a 
similar line of reasoning in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Indian Reservation.112  He said that a tribe’s power to tax “is a 
fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless 
divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent 
status.”113  I would part company with Justice White’s reliance on 
divestiture through “dependent status” as a means of reducing a tribe’s 
aboriginal power to tax.  Likewise, I would reject “dependent status” as 
 
 109. See id. at 214 (stating that federal Indian law and federal equity practice “preclude the 
Tribe from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold.”). 
 110. See id. at 214-15. 
 111. Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg describes the Oneida Nation as seeking “declaratory and 
injunctive relief recognizing its present and future sovereign immunity from local taxation on 
parcels of land the Tribe purchased.”  Id. at 214.  The use of the phrase “sovereign immunity” 
instead of “immunity from taxation” or “tax immunity” suggests that the Oneida Nation at least was 
making a connection between its sovereign immunity and its immunity from state taxation. 
 112. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
 113. See id. at 152.  In terms of the tribe’s power to tax in the Colville case, the Court 
concluded that such power was not inconsistent with the national power of the United States and, 
therefore, was not divested by the dependent status of the tribe.  For a discussion of “dependent 
status” and the application of “implicit divestiture,” see John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture 
Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen's Handbook Cutting-Room Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731 
(2006).  From a judicial point of view, the United States Supreme Court described tribes as 
“domestic dependent nations” in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) 
(confirming their political independence but noting that the language of treaties places them under 
the protection of the United States). 
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somehow providing a justification for state taxation of a tribe.114  
Instead, the focus should be on explicit authorization from Congress.115  
In any case, the core of the rationale for tribal tax immunity should be 
the preservation of tribal sovereignty.116 
B. Tribal Activities “Off” the Reservation 
As I discussed in the preceding section, the Mescalero case found 
that “off” reservation activity of a tribe enjoyed no immunity from state 
taxation unless Congress by legislation limited the state’s power to 
tax.117  In Mescalero, placing the activity “off” the reservation was 
straightforward because the ski resort was located on lands just outside 
the Mescalero Apache reservation.118  Likewise, in locating the gas 
station owned and operated by the Chickasaw Nation within its 
reservation was factually uncomplicated.119  In many cases, however, 
placing a transaction “on” or “off” a reservation will be difficult because 
one transaction may be composed of parts and stages that will have a 
connection both on and off the reservation. 
A good example of this possible difficulty is Central Machinery 
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission.120  Although Central Machinery 
involved state taxation of a non-Indian and the preemptive effect of the 
federal Indian trader statute, the location of the transaction “on” the 
reservation was critical to the outcome.121  The underlying transaction 
involved Central Machinery’s sale of equipment to the Gila River Indian 
 
 114. Indeed, the opinion of Justice Thomas in Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa 
Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998) stated that the intent of Congress to authorize state and local taxation 
of Indian reservation land must be “unmistakably clear.”  See id. at 110. 
 115. Even here, I must add that Congress should not unilaterally divest tribes of their 
sovereignty.  If Congress authorizes state taxation of tribes, then the sovereignty of tribes 
diminishes. 
 116. Two interesting examples of Congress preserving immunity are Public Law 280 and the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Public Law 280, which had the effect of shifting criminal 
jurisdiction within Indian country from the federal government to enumerated states, specifically 
provided that “[n]othing in this section shall authorize . . . taxation of any real or personal property . 
. . belonging to any Indian or Indian tribe.”  Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 2, 67 Stat. 
588, 589 (1953) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (2006)).  The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act has a 
similar provision.  This provision states that “nothing in this section shall be interpreted as 
conferring upon a State . . . authority to impose any tax . . . upon an Indian tribe.” Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, § 11(d)(4), 102 Stat. 2472, 2477 (1988). 
 117. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973). 
 118. See id. at 146. 
 119. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
 120. See Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980). 
 121. See id. at 165. 
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Community.122  Central Machinery was located off the reservation, but 
its salesman solicited the sale on the reservation.123  In addition, the 
signing of the contract, the payment, and the delivery all took place on 
the reservation.124  This led the Court to conclude that the Indian trader 
statute preempted the Arizona tax.125 
In the case of tribal bonds, much of the work will be done both 
“on” and “off” the reservation.  Certainly, the central purpose of the 
bond issuance is to borrow money to fund governmental projects of the 
tribe.  Accordingly, the physical results of the use of the borrowed funds 
will be on the reservation (schools, roads, government buildings, water 
supply projects, waste water treatment facilities).  In contrast, the bond 
underwriter and the bond purchasers probably will be located off the 
reservation.  Locating the bond issue “on” or “off” the reservation is not 
so easy given that Mescalero and Central Machinery are the only cases 
that have addressed the question.126 
C. Legal Incidence 
The concept of “legal incidence” of a tax has its practical 
application primarily in the context of intergovernmental tax immunity.  
Intergovernmental tax immunity is a constitutional concept whose 
genesis comes from the early nineteenth century case of McCulloch v. 
Maryland.127  In McCulloch, the tax issue became constitutional because 
Justice John Marshall viewed Maryland’s tax on bank notes issued by a 
federally chartered bank as a state tax on the functioning of the federal 
government.128  Justice Marshall concluded that such a power could not 
exist because “the power to tax involves the power to destroy,”129 
meaning that a state could theoretically destroy the federal government 
with such a taxing power.  Justice Marshall reasoned that the 
Constitution assumed that the federal government would be immune 
 
 122. See id. at 161. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 164 (1980). 
 126. See Scott A. Taylor, A Judicial Framework for Applying Supreme Court Jurisprudence to 
the State Income Taxation Of Indian Traders, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 841, 898-901 (2007) 
(discussing the on/off distinction in the context of the income taxation of Indian traders). 
 127. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
 128. See id. at 432 (equating the state taxation of the bank’s bonds with state taxation of the 
U.S. mails, which, according to Justice Marshall, would be inappropriate). 
 129. See id. at 431. 
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from state taxation because the states never possessed the power to tax 
the federal government.130   
The federal immunity from state taxation became a reciprocal rule, 
one providing state immunity from federal taxation, when the United 
States Supreme Court, in Collector v. Day,131 held that Congress could 
not impose a federal income tax on the salary of a state judge from 
Massachusetts.132  In the Day case, the Court assumed that a federal 
income tax on a state judge’s salary paid by Massachusetts was a tax on 
Massachusetts because the judge’s state function and his salary were 
viewed as inseparable.133  The Day case spawned substantial litigation 
during the 1920s and 1930s under the federal income tax.134  These cases 
looked at the state’s payment of income to employees and how the 
imposition of the federal income tax caused an economic burden on the 
state.135  The United States Supreme Court reconsidered the soundness 
of its economic burden analysis in 1938 in Helvering v. Gerhardt136 and 
concluded that the actual burden on the state was not shown and more 
likely fell on the individual.137  The Court further noted that exemption 
from the federal income tax produced a windfall for the individual 
taxpayer with only an insubstantial or speculative benefit for the state.138  
The next year the Court used the same reasoning to allow state income 
taxation of a federal employee in Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe.139   
The concept of legal incidence, as the analytical linchpin in the 
context of intergovernmental tax immunity, did not reach its full flower, 
however, until 1982, when the Court, in United States v. New Mexico,140 
decided that the legal incidence of a tax, and not its economic burden, 
was the decisive factor in deciding whether the federal government was 
immune from a state tax.141  In the New Mexico case, contractors with 
 
 130. See id. at 430 (concluding that the states never possessed the power to impede federal 
governmental activity through taxation). 
 131. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).  
 132. Id. at 126. 
 133. See id. at 122-23. 
 134. For some of these cases, see Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, n.6 (1938). 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. at 405. 
 137. See id. at 420. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939) (stating that the theory that “a tax on 
income is legally or economically a tax on its source, is no longer tenable”).  See id. at 480.  
 140. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982). 
 141. See id. at n.11 (“With the abandonment of the notion that the economic – as opposed to 
the legal – incidence of the tax is relevant, it becomes difficult to maintain that federal tax immunity 
is designed to insulate federal operations from the effect of state taxation.” Id.). 
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the federal government procured goods and service for the benefit of 
United States, and New Mexico imposed its gross receipts tax on these 
sales.142  The purchases were paid directly by the federal government 
under a contractual arrangement with the contractors.143  Clearly, then, 
the economic burden of these state taxes fell directly on the United 
States.  The Court, however, found that the contractors were not federal 
instrumentalities144 and that the “legal incidence” of the New Mexico 
gross receipts tax fell on the contractors145 and not on the United States.  
Absent from the opinion in the New Mexico decision was any discussion 
of the meaning of the “legal incidence” concept.  In summarizing the 
state of the case law as it addressed the issue in a related case four years 
earlier, the Tenth Circuit noted that the concept of “legal incidence” had 
“never been explicitly formulated by the Supreme Court.”146  And the 
Supreme Court in its New Mexico opinion developed the concept of 
“legal incidence” no further because the United States had conceded that 
the legal incidence of the New Mexico gross receipts tax fell on the 
contractors and not on the United States.147  
By 1988, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the 
federal income taxation of interest on state and local bonds in South 
Carolina v. Baker.148  South Carolina asserted that a federal income tax 
on the interest of its bonds was a direct tax on the state and therefore 
unconstitutional under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax 
immunity.149  The Court rejected this argument and found that the tax, if 
imposed, would be paid by the bondholders on whom the legal incidence 
of the tax would fall.150  The Court acknowledged that the state would 
have to pay a higher interest rate, but that this would be an 
administrative cost, not a tax.151 
In 1995, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,152 the “legal incidence” concept 
became part of the federal case law dealing with tribal immunity from 
 
 142. See id. at 728. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982). 
 145. See id. at 738. 
 146. United States v. New Mexico, 581 F.2d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1978) (involving contractors 
dealing with the federal White Sands Missile Range). 
 147. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 738 (1982). 
 148. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
 149. See id. at 508. 
 150. See id. at 526. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
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state taxation.  In the Chickasaw Nation case, Oklahoma attempted to 
impose its fuel excise tax on sales of gasoline made by the Chickasaw 
Nation at its convenience stores located on the reservation.153  Relying 
on the legal conclusion drawn by the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court 
found that the legal incidence of the Oklahoma fuel excise tax fell on the 
Chickasaw Nation and not on the wholesaler or the final consumer.154  
Oklahoma contested the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion,155 but the Supreme 
Court felt that the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion had been reasonable.156  
Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court, hailed 
the “legal incidence” test as a “bright-line standard” that would aid tax 
administration.157  Absent from the discussion is any meaningful 
definition of “legal incidence.”  And Justice Ginsburg’s discussion of the 
issue shows that the Oklahoma statute in question was not clear on legal 
incidence, and that the federal court of appeals was left with the chore of 
interpreting this state tax statute.158  Finally, Justice Ginsburg noted that 
“legal incidence” allows a certain amount of flexibility if a state is 
willing to amend its taxing statute so that the text of the law places the 
legal incidence of the fuel excise tax on a person other than the tribe.159   
Indeed, Kansas availed itself of this flexibility to insure that the 
legal incidence of its fuel excise tax would not fall on the tribe.  In this 
way, the tribe would have no tax immunity.  In Wagnon v. Prairie Band 
Potawatomi Nation,160 Kansas wrote its fuel excise tax statute so that the 
tax would fall on off-reservation wholesalers before delivery to gas 
stations owned by tribes.161  In this case, the Prairie Band of the 
Potawatomi Nation owned a gas station operated primarily as a 
convenience for customers driving to and from the Nation’s casino.162  
The Court found that the legal incidence of the fuel excise tax applied to 
wholesalers off the reservation before they sold their fuel to the gas 
station of the Nation.163  Accordingly, the Wagnon decision shows that 
the “legal incidence” test makes the doctrine of intergovernmental 
 
 153. See id. at 455. 
 154. See id. at 460. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. at 461. 
 157. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 460 (1995). 
 158. See id. at 461. 
 159. See id. at 460. 
 160. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005). 
 161. See Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d 979, 982 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(indicating that Kansas amended its fuel excise tax statute so that the legal incidence would shift in 
a way so that it could tax on-reservation sales of gasoline). 
 162. See Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 99. 
 163. See id. at 102-03. 
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immunity essentially meaningless in those cases where the particular 
government is willing and able to change its tax statute so that the legal 
incidence shifts to a person who does not enjoy immunity. 
Almost all individual income taxes are written in a way so that the 
individual taxpayer’s income is the subject of the tax for which the 
individual has final liability of payment.164  Nonetheless, it is common 
for income tax systems to use withholding at the source so that payers of 
income are responsible for initial withholding and payment of the 
income tax.165  This is true in the United States where employers are 
responsible for withholding and paying the federal income tax on the 
wages of their employees.166  If an employer neglects to withhold and 
pay, then the employer faces financial liability for non-payment even 
though the income tax is a personal liability of the employee.167  Even 
with this additional legal liability for employers, we still assume that the 
legal incidence of the federal income tax is on the individual.  We make 
the same assumption for state income taxes. 
In the case of interest on bonds, the payer has no obligation to 
withhold and pay the federal income tax on the interest income earned 
by the bond owner.168  However, the bond issuer has an obligation to 
report to the Internal Revenue Service the amount of interest that it paid 
to each bond owner.169  The bond owner, then, has the obligation to 
report this interest on the income tax form and to pay any resulting 
federal income tax liability.170  Before 2006, the issuer of a municipal 
bond had no obligation to report the amount of interest paid to each bond 
 
 164. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6012(a) (2006) (requiring individuals to file federal income tax 
returns); I.R.C. §§ 6151(a) (2006) (requiring payment of the tax by the person making and filing the 
return); MINN. STAT. § 289A.31(1)(A) (2009) (individual income tax “must be paid by the taxpayer 
upon whom the tax is imposed”); N.M. STAT. §§ 7-2-3 (2009) (imposing an income tax on residents 
and non-residents [with New Mexico source income] at specified rates); N.M. STAT. §§ 7-1-13(B) 
(requiring the filing of tax returns and the paying of tax). 
 165. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 290.92(2a)(1) (2009) (requiring employers to withhold the 
Minnesota income tax from the wages of employees and to pay this to the state); N.M. STAT. § 7-3-
3(A) (2009) (requiring employers to withhold the New Mexico income tax from the wages of the 
employees and to pay this to the state). 
 166. I.R.C. § 3402(a) (2006). 
 167. I.R.C. § 3403 (2006). 
 168. See I.R.C. § 3406 (2006) (requiring backup withholding if the payee of interest does not 
provide the payer with necessary information sufficient to allow information reporting to IRS).  The 
information reporting requirements for the payment of interest are contained in I.R.C. § 6049 
(2006). 
 169. See I.R.C. § 6049 (2006). 
 170. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2006) (defining interest as a form of gross income); Treas. Reg. § 1-
61-7(a). 
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owner.171  Now, however, information reporting is required, but the 
interest income still remains exempt from the federal income tax.172  For 
state income tax purposes, states can require in-state issuers to report the 
interest that they pay to bond owners.  However, states cannot require 
out-of-state issuers of municipal bonds to report interest payments to 
them.173  Accordingly, states have no practical way for imposing 
withholding and payment of their income taxes on interest paid by other 
state and local governments.174 
Therefore, for purposes of this article, I will assume that the legal 
incidence of the state income tax falls on the owner of the tribal bond 
and not on the tribe.  As a result, legal incidence, which can be 
especially tricky in cases involving sales, use, and excise taxes, is not 
such a troublesome issue here because everyone assumes that the legal 
incidence of the state income tax falls on the bond owner who receives 
the interest income.  Legal incidence would be relevant only if one tribe 
owned a bond issued by another tribe.  In that case, the legal incidence 
of the state income tax would fall on the bond-owning tribe.  Under the 
tribal immunity cases, a state would be unable to impose its income tax 
on the interest paid to a tribe within its boundaries.  In contrast, a non-
tribal owner of a tribal bond would not enjoy tribal immunity because 
the legal incidence of the state income tax falls on him, her, or it. 
IV. INDIAN PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
The broad notion of federal preemption of state law derives from 
the Supremacy Clause in the United States Constitution.  That clause 
provides that: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
 
 171. Before its amendment by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-222, §502, 120 Stat. 345, I.R.C. § 6049 (2006) specifically exempted interest on 
tax-exempt bonds from the reporting requirements. 
 172. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 173. This limitation applies because a state’s jurisdiction and taxing powers over 
extraterritorial matters are limited to those people and objects that have a nexus with the particular 
state.  See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1992) (holding that North Dakota 
could not require an out-of-state seller to impose and collect the state’s use tax on sales into the state 
when the only contact involved mail order sales and no physical presence). 
 174. See id. 
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any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.175 
The Supremacy Clause is a necessary working rule for deciding 
when the federal law displaces or nullifies state law.176  Assuming 
Congress has the power under the Constitution to pass a particular 
statute, then that federal statute’s effect on state law becomes a frequent 
question.   
In general, federal preemption is either express or implied.177  
Express preemption occurs when the text of a particular federal statute 
explicitly displaces state law.178  A good example of such preemption is 
the special rule prohibiting state taxation of treaty fishing rights retained 
by a federally recognized Indian tribe.  This provision states:  
Such treaties, and any Executive orders and Acts of Congress under 
which the rights of any Indian tribe to fish are secured, shall be 
construed to prohibit (in addition to any other prohibition) the 
imposition under any law of a State or political subdivision thereof of 
any tax on any income derived from the exercise of rights to fish 
secured by such treaty, Executive order, or Act of Congress if section 
7873 of Title 26 does not permit a like Federal tax to be imposed on 
such income.179 
 
 175. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 176. See JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 
1831 (Hilliard, Gray & Co., 1833) (stating that if “it was to establish a national government, that 
[federal] government ought, to the extent of its powers and rights, to be supreme.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (finding that a federal law 
preempts a state law when “Congress’ command is explicitly indicated in the statute's language or 
implicitly contained in its structure and purpose”). 
 178. See id. 
 179. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006).  By reference this statute incorporates the federal prohibition 
against federal taxation of tribal fishing rights.  The federal prohibition states: 
Sec. 7873. Income derived by Indians from exercise of fishing rights 
  (a) In general 
    (1) Income and self-employment taxes 
      No tax shall be imposed by subtitle A on income derived-- 
        (A) by a member of an Indian tribe directly or through a  
        qualified Indian entity, or 
        (B) by a qualified Indian entity, 
    from a fishing rights-related activity of such tribe. 
    (2) Employment taxes 
      No tax shall be imposed by subtitle C on remuneration paid for  
    services performed in a fishing rights-related activity of an Indian  
    tribe by a member of such tribe for another member of such tribe or  
    for a qualified Indian entity. 
I.R.C. § 7873 (2006). 
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In this statute, we see Congress using broad language that prohibits 
state taxation of income derived from the exercise of tribal fishing rights.  
When Congress uses such explicit language prohibiting state taxation, 
states rarely undertake the effort to tax the activity.180  In most instances, 
however, Congress provides no specific rules governing the preemptive 
effect of its legislation when such legislation deals with Indian country.  
This was the case with the federal income tax treatment of tribal bonds.  
Congress provided fairly specific rules on the federal income tax 
treatment of tribal bonds181 but provided no explicit prohibition of state 
income taxation of interest paid to tribal bond holders. 
Consequently, we are dealing with a case of implied preemption.  
Implied preemption is more difficult to determine because we have no 
explicit language to provide guidance.  The federal courts have 
developed something of a preemption jurisprudence when preemption is 
of the “implied” variety.  The two types are field preemption and 
conflict preemption.182  Field preemption arises when the federal 
regulatory scheme leaves little or no room for state participation.183  
Conflict preemption arises when a federal law and a state law lead to 
different results.184  With conflict preemption, the assumption is that the 
 
 180. See lack of reported cases involving this prohibition under 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006).  In 
contrast, states frequently assert their power to tax even when the activity is on the reservation and 
involves the tribe or a tribal member.  See, e.g., Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867) 
(county in Kansas attempts to impose property tax on lands owned by Shawnee Indians); Thomas v. 
Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) (Oklahoma Territory attempts to impose a tax on cattle owned by a non-
Indian when the cattle were on reservation lands under a lease with the tribe); Warren Trading Post 
v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (Arizona attempts to impose its sales tax on a 
federally licensed Indian trader selling goods and services on the Navajo Nation); McClanahan v. 
State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (Arizona attempts to impose its income tax on a 
Navajo woman who lives and works on the Navajo Nation); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 
(1976) (Minnesota county attempts to impose a property tax on a tribal member’s mobile home 
located on the Leech Lake Reservation); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 
(1995) (Oklahoma attempts to impose various taxes on the Chickasaw Nation and its members); 
Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (Kansas attempts to impose motor 
fuel taxes on gasoline sold at a station owned by the tribe on its reservation).  
 181. See I.R.C. §§ 7871(c), (e) (2006). 
 182. See Patricia L. Donze, Legislating Comity: Can Congress Enforce Federalism Constraints 
Through Restrictions on Preemption Doctrine?, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 239, 249-50 
(2000/2001). 
 183. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (discussing the general 
federal regulation of grain elevators occupied the field and prevented concurrent state regulation). 
 184. See, e.g., Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 
461, 469-70 (1984) (invalidating state statute that conflicted with federal statute regulating 
agriculture). 
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result flowing from application of the federal law is the one Congress 
would prefer.185   
Within the context of federal Indian law, the rules of preemption 
operate somewhat differently.186  Often referred to as “Indian 
preemption,”187 this different approach reflects 1) the continuing 
importance of tribal sovereignty188; 2) the presence of a third party (the 
tribe) in which there is a special federal interest, as shown in treaties, 
executive orders, and substantial federal legislation and regulation189; 
and 3) the absence of a seat at the political table for the tribes.190  The 
Supreme Court, as is so often the case with its jurisprudence in most 
areas of law, has failed to refine Indian preemption into a coherent, 
logical whole.191  Instead, Indian preemption may be summarized as a 
process in which the Court considers and balances the various tribal, 
federal, and state interests.192  As a result, Indian preemption may 
adversely affect state law under circumstances when traditional 
preemption would not.  Therefore, it is important to review Indian 
preemption to see when and how the interest-balancing process comes 
into play as an overlay to the implied preemption discussed above. 
The story of Indian preemption begins with the 1832 case of 
Worcester v. Georgia.193  In that case, Justice John Marshall articulated 
the proposition that state laws did not extend into Indian country, even if 
 
 185. See id. 
 186. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980): 
The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply to 
federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards of pre-emption that have 
emerged in other areas of the law.  Tribal reservations are not States, and the differences 
in the form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions 
of pre-emption that are properly applied to the other. 
Id. 
 187. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 
32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 391, 416-20 (2007/2008) (discussing Indian preemption as a separate form 
of preemption). 
 188. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the 
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1607 (1963) (stating that “the unique 
historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments 
regulating Indian tribes those standards of pre-emption that have emerged in other areas of the 
law.”). 
 189. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1973) (emphasizing 
the importance of treaties and federal legislation). 
 190. See Taylor, supra note 126, at 886-90 [Michigan State] (emphasizing how the political 
framework of Congress adequately protects state interests but does not protect or incorporate tribal 
interests). 
 191. See Skibine, supra note 187, at 416-20. 
 192. See id. 
 193. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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the particular Indian reservation was located solely within a particular 
state.194  The Worcester case was one episode in a very complicated 
history in which Georgia, aided and abetted by President Jackson, but 
not supported by Congress or the Supreme Court, attempted to remove 
the Cherokee from their homelands in Georgia to territory that later 
became Oklahoma.195  Part of Georgia’s plan to expel the Cherokee to 
gain access to their lands, and the gold thought to be there, was a legal 
regime that required all white people to acquire a license from Georgia 
before entering the Cherokee Nation.196  This legislation attempted to 
isolate the Cherokee from Indian traders and Christian missionaries, 
many of whom supported the right of the Cherokee to remain on their 
lands.  Samuel Worcester was a missionary from Vermont197 whose 
church received federal funding for its missionary efforts.198  Worcester 
undertook missionary activities with federal permission199 but without 
obtaining a license under the Georgia statute.200  Worcester’s failure to 
secure a license under Georgia law exposed him to criminal liability.201  
When he traveled off of the Cherokee Nation onto Georgia soil, he was 
arrested, charged, tried, convicted, and imprisoned for violating Georgia 
law.202  He appealed his case, which ultimately made its way to the 
United States Supreme Court.203  Georgia refused to appear in the 
case,204 presumably because it viewed its sovereignty over its own soil 
as paramount to the Cherokee Nation’s aboriginal title confirmed by 
federal treaties.  Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall concluded that 
Georgia’s regulations and criminal provisions did not extend into the 
territory of the Cherokee Nation even though its territory was 
geographically within the boundaries of Georgia.205  Reduced to its 
 
 194. See id. at 561. 
 195. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 106-07 (1970). 
 196. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 539-40. 
 197. See id. at 538. 
 198. See JAMES W. FRASER, BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE: RELIGION AND PUBLIC 
EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 89-92 (1999) (describing federal funding of mission 
schools on reservations beginning in 1819). 
 199. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 538 (1832).  
 200. See id. at 537. 
 201. See id. at 536. 
 202. See id. at 540. 
 203. See id. at 536. 
 204. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 535 (1832) (listing no counsel for Georgia 
and providing no summary of Georgia’s legal position).  
 205. See id. at 561 (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own 
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and 
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves 
or in conformity with treaties and with acts of Congress.”). 
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simplest formulation, the Worcester case essentially held that the 
presence of a federal-tribal relationship between the United States and 
the Cherokee Nation, as reflected in treaties and federal legislation, 
excluded the application of state law.206  The key point is that the treaties 
and federal legislation never stated that Georgia law had no application 
within the Cherokee Nation.  Instead, Justice Marshall inferred that the 
federal presence left no room for Georgia to exert its legislative power.  
In kernel form, then, the Worcester case expressed an early form of field 
preemption. 
Reality, however, departed from the rule of law.  Even though the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Worcester nullified the state court 
conviction, Georgia ignored the Court’s ruling and refused to release 
Samuel Worcester from prison.207  President Jackson was standing for 
reelection and needed Georgia’s votes in the Electoral College.208  In 
addition, President Jackson had already endorsed a removal policy for 
the Cherokee Nation and other tribes.209  Accordingly, he was unwilling 
to use federal force to free Samuel Worcester from the Georgia prison.210  
Facing a long imprisonment, Samuel Worcester accepted Georgia’s offer 
to release him from prison if he left Georgia.  He abandoned his 
missionary work on the Cherokee Nation in Georgia and moved to the 
Indian Territory (later Oklahoma) to continue his missionary work with 
the Cherokee.211  Ultimately, the Jackson administration negotiated a 
treaty with the Cherokee Nation in which the tribe agreed to removal to 
Oklahoma.212  This treaty, however, was a fraud.213  The treaty-making 
process between the United States and the Cherokee Nation followed the 
treaty-making formalities but did not include a valid expression of 
consent from the leaders of the Cherokee Nation.214  Ultimately, Georgia 
succeeded in its efforts at ethnic cleansing.  The actual removal of the 
Cherokee was a brutal process in which thousands of Cherokee perished 
 
 206. See id. (“The act of the State of Georgia under which the plaintiff in error was prosecuted 
is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity.”). 
 207. See DEBO, supra note 195, at 105-06. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See T. HARRY WILLIAMS ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES TO 1876, at 370 
(1959) (explaining the support that Jackson received from southern states by pursuing a removal 
policy for Native Americans). 
 210. See DEBO, supra note 195, at 105-06. 
 211. See ALTHEA BASS, CHEROKEE MESSENGER 5 (1996). 
 212. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL 
ANOMALY 168-82 (1994) (describing Jackson-era treaties). 
 213. See BASS, supra note 211, at 5 (describing how a small group of Cherokee formed the 
Treaty Party with whom the United States negotiated an illegal treaty). 
 214. Id. 
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along the now infamous Trail of Tears.215  Notwithstanding these tragic 
historical events, the Worcester case remains an important precedent 
establishing the basic principles of federal preemption. 
For our purposes, we can skip forward to 1959 when the United 
States Supreme Court decided Williams v. Lee.216  This case involved the 
question of state court jurisdiction over a suit by an Indian trader, Hugh 
Lee, who sued to collect on a debt incurred by Navajo customers, Paul 
and Lorena Williams, for the sale of goods.217  The underlying 
transaction took place entirely on the Navajo Nation.218  Even though he 
could have sued in a Navajo court, Lee sued in the Arizona state court.219  
Relying on Worcester v. Georgia,220 the Court concluded that state 
jurisdiction over the lawsuit would infringe the right of the Navajo 
Nation to govern itself.221  In the absence of an express authorization 
from Congress, states, with limited exceptions, have no power over 
tribes.222  The William v. Lee case stands for the broad proposition that 
state law, unless authorized by Congress, cannot infringe tribal 
sovereignty. 
Together, Worcester and Williams stand for the proposition that 
state laws stop at the reservation boundary.  For state laws to cross this 
boundary, Congress must authorize states to exercise judicial and 
legislative power within Indian country.  The rationale that we extract 
from Williams is that the federal-tribal relationship is intended to protect 
tribal sovereignty, including possible infringement by the states.   
The next important decision is Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax 
Commission.223  This case is the primary precedent for federal 
preemption.  In Warren Trading Post, the United States Supreme Court 
found that treaties, federal legislation, and federal regulations preempted 
state taxation of licensed Indian traders.224  No text in these sources of 
the law specifically mentioned state taxation.  Instead, the Court found 
that the federal presence was so pervasive that it left no room for state 
taxation.225  This case, then, is a form of simple field preemption. 
 
 215. See DEBO, supra note 195, at 106-07. 
 216. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
 217. Id. at 217. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Id. 
 220. See id. at 218-19 (discussing the application of Worcester v. Georgia). 
 221. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). 
 222. See id. 
 223. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965). 
 224. See id. at 691-92. 
 225. See id. at 691. 
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The infringement concerns expressed in Williams and the field 
preemption found in Warren Trading Post come together in White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker.226  Bracker involved state taxation 
of non-Indian contractors who hauled harvested timber for the tribe.227 
The Court concluded that infringement and preemption were 
independent barriers to state taxation.228  In addition, the Court found 
that infringement was an important backdrop in determining whether 
ambiguous federal legislation actually preempted the state power to 
tax.229  Finally, the Court considered and weighed the tribal, state, and 
federal interests.230  The Court found that the attempts of a state to tax 
non-Indians required a “particularized inquiry into the nature of the 
state, federal, and tribal interests at stake.”231 
The Indian preemption doctrine as applied in three subsequent 
cases is worthy of our attention.  The first case is Cotton Petroleum 
Corp. v. New Mexico,232 a case in which the Court upheld state taxation 
of oil production on Indian lands by a non-Indian oil company.233  For 
our purposes here, the key point in Cotton Petroleum is that Congress 
can authorize state taxation of non-Indians just as it can, explicitly or 
through implied preemption, bar state taxation.  In Cotton Petroleum, the 
Court found that early federal legislation had authorized state taxation, 
and that subsequent federal legislation did not change this 
authorization.234  The Court also explained that, in the absence of federal 
preemption, states generally can tax non-Indians for their activities 
within Indian country.235  Finally, the Court acknowledged, as part of its 
preemption analysis, that state taxation can infringe tribal sovereignty 
and can, therefore, be barred by the infringement test.236  The Court, 
however, found that there was no evidence that the state tax actually 
infringed tribal sovereignty.237 
 
 226. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 
 227. See id. at 139. 
 228. See id. at 143 (“The two barriers [infringement and preemption] are independent because 
either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity 
undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members.”). 
 229. See id.  
 230. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980). 
 231. Id. at 145. 
 232. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
 233. See id. at 186-87. 
 234. See id. at 182. 
 235. See id. at 173-76. 
 236. See id. at 186-87. 
 237. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 187 (1989). 
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In the case of Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze 
Construction Co., the reach of federal preemption was narrowed.238  In 
Blaze, a road construction company entered into road building contracts 
with the federal government.239  All the building took place on Indian 
reservations within the state of Arizona.240  Blaze Construction 
Company, the road builder, asserted that various federal statutes 
preempted Arizona’s taxation of the construction activity.241  The Court, 
however, held that the company was doing business with the United 
States, not the Indian tribes.242  As a result, the Court found that the 
federal statutes did not apply to the company and did not preempt state 
taxation.  Likewise, in the case of Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi 
Nation,243 the Court undertook a very technical consideration of the 
preemption cases and concluded that state taxation whose legal 
incidence is physically located off the reservation does require 
application of the Indian preemption doctrine.244 
Together, these cases recognize an Indian preemption doctrine in 
which the tribal, state, and federal interests must be considered in light 
of the normal preemption rules.  Given these cases, the primary question 
is whether Indian preemption even applies in the context of state income 
taxation of interest paid on tribal bonds.  An application of Justice 
Thomas’ approach in Wagnon could lead to the conclusion that the state 
income tax on the tribal bond interest is a non-discriminatory state tax 
that applies to a non-Indian on a transaction that takes place outside of 
Indian country.  In Wagnon, Justice Thomas emphasized the “who” and 
the “where.”245  He concluded that a non-Indian was the person subject 
to a state tax on a transaction taking place off the reservation.246  These 
circumstances, he concluded, took the transaction and the related state 
taxation outside the scope of the Indian preemption doctrine.247  To place 
this analysis in its proper context, we need to recall that the tax in 
Wagnon was a Kansas fuel excise tax imposed on a non-Indian fuel 
wholesaler taking delivery of the fuel off the reservation.  The tribe 
bought the gasoline from the wholesaler who then delivered it on the 
 
 238. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999). 
 239. See id. at 34. 
 240. See id.  
 241. See id. at 37. 
 242. See id. 
 243. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005). 
 244. See id. at 101-02. 
 245. See id. at 101. 
 246. See id. at 102. 
 247. See id. at 101-02. 
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reservation to the tribe and included the Kansas fuel excise tax in the 
price.248  The tribe then sold the gasoline on its reservation mostly to 
motorists who were on their way to or from the tribe’s nearby casino.249  
Even though the tribe sold the gas at its own gas station located on the 
reservation, the tribe was not the taxpayer, and the time and place of 
taxation was not the tribe’s retail sale of gasoline to the final 
consumer.250  According to Justice Thomas, the Indian preemption 
doctrine did not apply and a consideration of the tribal, federal, and state 
interests was, therefore, unnecessary.251 
Justice Thomas acknowledged that Kansas in the Wagnon case had 
changed its law so that its legal incidence would shift away from the 
tribe and onto non-Indian wholesalers whose taxable conduct would take 
place outside of Indian country.252  Justice Ginsburg, in her opinion in 
Chickasaw Nation ten years earlier, had observed that states could get 
around tribal immunity from state taxation by changing the legal 
incidence of their taxes.253  She did not, however, indicate if this change 
would necessarily eliminate the need to undertake a preemption analysis.  
Instead, she conceded that state taxation of tribal interests located off the 
reservation could be preempted.254 
In contrast, application of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s approach in 
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission255 would 
definitely lead to an opposite conclusion.  In Central Machinery, Justice 
Marshall looked at the circumstances and events that made up a 
transaction involving the sale of farm machinery to the tribe.256  Some of 
the transaction took place off the reservation, and part took place on the 
 
 248. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 99-100 (2005). 
 249. See id. at 99. 
 250. See id. at 102-03. 
 251. See id. at 110 (concluding that the Bracker preemption test should not apply when the tax 
is imposed on a non-Indian outside of the reservation). 
 252. See id. at 105.  See also Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d 979, 982 
(10th Cir. 2004) (indicating that Kansas amended its fuel excise tax statute so that the legal 
incidence would shift in a way so that it could tax on-reservation sales of gasoline). 
 253. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 460 (1995) (noting that “if a 
State is unable to enforce a tax because the legal incidence of the impost is on Indians or Indian 
tribes, the State generally is free to amend its law to shift the tax’s legal incidence.”). 
 254. See id. at 465 (evaluating whether a treaty between the United States and the Chickasaw 
Nation preempted the Oklahoma income tax on tribal members working for the Nation but living off 
its reservation). 
 255. See Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980). 
 256. See id. at 161.  
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reservation.257  All things considered, Justice Marshall concluded that 
the primary focus of the transaction was on the reservation.258 
As I noted earlier in the discussion about state taxation in Indian 
country, the location of the taxable activity as taking place on or off the 
reservation is a key consideration.  Indeed, the results in Central 
Machinery, Mescalero Apache, and Wagnon hinged on the location of 
the activity.  Implicit in the Court’s analysis is a rather crude notion of 
boundaries and territoriality that harkens back to reservation policies 
designed to dispossess, dominate, pacify, and isolate Native Americans 
within confined areas called reservation, but which, to be honest, often 
constituted nineteenth century internment camps.  Since 1934, federal 
policy, with some important lapses, has focused on supporting Indian 
tribes as political entities retaining some degree of aboriginal 
sovereignty used to govern their communities and to exercise self-
determination.259  The legal260 and physical forms261 of tribes vary 
tremendously as do their territorial manifestations.262  Consequently, it 
seems rather odd that the Supreme Court should draw a line in the sand 
that corresponds directly with the reservation boundary, especially when 
most aspects of daily life in the United States regularly cross political 
boundaries of reservation, city, town, county, state, and country. 
All the circumstances that make up a single tribal bond transaction 
are likely to cross all or most of these boundaries.  To decide, then, that 
the state income taxation of the interest that the tribe pays to the bond 
owner is of no political, jurisdictional, or financial interest to the tribe 
seems ridiculous.  Yet the approach of Justice Thomas in Wagnon is 
likely to lead to that result because he probably would view the bond 
owner’s receipt of the interest income and off-reservation residence as 
sufficient to eliminate any tribal interest.  However, the focus of the 
tribal bond transaction is the financing of a project on the reservation 
 
 257. See id. 
 258. See id. at 164-65 (focusing on the place where the contract for sale was executed and how 
the tribe took delivery).  
 259. See Taylor, supra note 126, at 948. 
 260. See Christine Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law as Indigenous Social Reality and Separate 
Consciousness: [Re]Incorporating Customs and Traditions into Tribal Law, 1 N.M. TRIBAL L.J. 
(2000/2001), available at http://tlj.unm.edu/tribal-law-journal/articles/volume_1/zuni_cruz/ 
index.php (discussing variations in tribal legal systems that include traditional, hybrid, and modern 
American).  
 261. See L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising 
Sovereignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 122-49 (1994) (describing varying land 
ownership and demographic patterns on various reservations).  
 262. See PRUCHA, supra note 33, at 37-42 (1990) (containing maps showing Indian reservations 
from 1887 to 1987). 
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that furthers an essential governmental function263 of the tribe.  Indeed, 
the tribal bond’s tax-exempt status for federal income tax purposes 
requires that the bond proceeds be used to further an essential 
governmental function of the tribe.264  The transaction itself and the 
federal income tax treatment that follows show important tribal and 
federal interests.  
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s approach in Central Machinery, even 
though it proceeded from the assumption that the transaction in question 
must be located within the tribe’s reservation, was more nuanced than 
Justice Thomas’ approach in Wagnon.  Justice Marshall considered the 
focus of the Central Machinery transaction in the context of a strong 
federal interest and a concern for the sovereignty of the tribe.265  Justice 
Thomas, in contrast, first located the taxable event off the reservation 
and then concluded that balancing the respective state, federal, and tribal 
interests was unnecessary.266  Justice Marshall, nonetheless, still 
conceded that the transaction must be “on” the reservation for the 
preemption analysis to apply.267  And at this point he focused on facts 
showing that the place of executing the contract, the place of taking 
possession, and the place of payment were all on the reservation.268  Are 
these really important factors, given that imposition of the Arizona’s 
sales tax will be a financial burden on the tribe purchasing the farm 
machinery?  Is form of payment really that important?  Should the 
preemption of the state tax hinge on whether the payment was hand-
delivered off the reservation, took place physically on the reservation, or 
occurred by sending a check through the mail? 
So although Justice Marshall’s approach shows more flexibility 
than the approach of Justice Thomas, both approaches focus on fairly 
meaningless factors.  In this sense, both seem to be conceding that 
matters of state taxation in Indian country are rather arbitrary and often 
allow meaningless factors of form ultimately to decide the outcome.  I 
am a law professor who teaches federal income tax and must confess 
that federal tax law as written, applied, and interpreted often exalts form 
over substance.  Form is important in the federal tax system as a way of 
promoting clarity and predictability.  Nonetheless, substance can and 
 
 263. See I.R.C. §§ 7871(c)(1), (e) (2006) (requiring the proceeds of tribal bonds to be used in 
the exercise of essential governmental functions).  
 264. See id. 
 265. See Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 163-64 (1980). 
 266. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 110 (2005). 
 267. See Central Machinery, 448 U.S. at 165. 
 268. See id. at 164-65. 
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does apply in many circumstances to control questions of taxability in 
the federal system.269 
In contrast, the primary purpose of the Indian preemption doctrine 
is, in the absence of explicit federal guidance, to consider important and 
competing tribal, federal, and state interests.  Consequently, substance 
should be the overriding concern.  It is fair to say that Justice Thomas’s 
approach in Wagnon exalted form over substance and prevented the 
Court from considering how the tribe’s gas station and the imposition of 
the state fuel excise tax played out when tied to the tribal, federal, and 
state interests. 
The categorical “where” in the analysis ought to be abandoned, 
because it focuses too much on form and too little on the substance of 
the actual taxes.  Instead, the Court, in deciding whether to apply Indian 
preemption, should look at the presence of federal and tribal interests.  
The most important evidence of a federal interest will be federal 
legislation.  There should be some connection between the federal 
legislation and the subject matter of the attempted state taxation.  The 
tribal interest will manifest itself most by looking at how the state 
taxation imposes a financial burden on the tribe and impedes the tribe in 
its operation as a government.  At this point, the “where” question, 
instead of being one that concludes that the transaction is either “on” or 
“off” the reservation, should look at the overall transaction and its 
connection to the tribal, federal, and state interests.  Here the transaction 
can be linked to its function to assist in determining the relative weight 
to be given to each of the interests.   
The “who” question is connected to legal incidence.  As I 
previously discussed, legal incidence means little more than a tax statute 
naming the taxpayer.  In the context of state income taxation of interest 
on tribal bonds, the legal incidence will fall on the bond owner who most 
likely will be a person who is not a tribe or a member of a tribe.  To bar 
state income taxation at this point, Indian preemption must come into 
play.  The “who” question, as a result, is unimportant.  This takes us 
back to the “where” question. 
Assuming, then, that the interest balancing process should begin, 
how do the interests fare?  It is appropriate to start with the tribal interest 
because it is the tribe that must carry the financial burden of increased 
borrowing costs if states are allowed to impose their state income tax on 
 
 269. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (finding that a purported 
reorganization that met all statutory requirements was, nonetheless, not a reorganization because it 
lacked substance); Rev. Rul. 2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 760 (stating categorically that the “substance of 
a transaction, not its form, governs its tax treatment.”). 
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tribal bond interest income.  Tribal bond financing of the kind we are 
discussing involves the funding of projects that further essential 
governmental functions of the tribe.  These projects involve water, 
sewer, roads, governmental buildings, governmental services, education, 
health, and other essential functions of government.  In general, tribal 
members living on reservations are among the poorest Americans often 
lacking the barest necessities of life.270  Given these social ills, Congress 
probably believed that tribal bonds, like state and local ones, should 
enjoy the same exempt status for federal income tax purposes as a way 
of lessening the cost of borrowing.  Because of the great economic needs 
of tribes and their members, exemption from state income taxation is all 
the more important.  Congress recognized the need to lessen the cost of 
tribal borrowing.  Therefore, state income taxation of tribal bond interest 
contradicts the federal purpose of lowering the borrowing costs of tribes.   
More generally, a core interest of all governments is tax revenue.  
Without revenue, a government cannot function.  Most states raise most 
of their revenue through taxation.  A state’s power to tax, then, is one of 
its most important governmental powers.  Accordingly, Congress and 
federal courts need to consider any constraints on a state’s taxing power 
quite carefully.  In this article, I assume that Congress has the power to 
preempt a state’s taxing power if necessary to promote and regulate 
Indian affairs.  Thus, when the tribal interest is strong and where federal 
legislation promotes that tribal interest, then the state taxing power 
should yield.  Within a federal system, this result may seem too harsh on 
the states.  However, this is not the case.  The states are not irretrievably 
harmed because Congress, having enacted legislation suggesting that 
Indian preemption is appropriate, has the power to enact legislation 
authorizing state taxation. 
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act271 (IGRA) is a good example of 
how Congress can respond to situations where the Court interprets 
federal legislation and its preemptive effect in a way that benefits tribes.  
Congress passed IGRA in 1988 because the United States Supreme 
Court had ruled in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians that 
the tribe could operate a high stakes bingo facility on its reservation, 
 
 270. US Census data from 2006 showed Native Americans as having the highest poverty rate at 
over 25 percent, which is twice the national average.  See US Census Bureau, Press Release: Income 
Climbs, Poverty Stabilizes, Uninsured Rate Increases, CB 06-136 (Aug. 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income_wealth/007419.html.  
 271. See Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 
2701-2721 (2006)). 
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even though California law made those kinds of bingo games illegal.272  
The Court’s decision, in an opinion by Justice White, found substantial 
legal ambiguity on the question of the application of California law 
within Indian country.273  Ultimately, the Court found in favor of the 
tribal interest, upholding the legality of the tribe’s bingo operation.274   
As a group, states were concerned about the uncontrolled expansion 
of Indian gaming after the Cabazon decision.275  Congress responded 
with IGRA, which gave states a say in Indian gaming and required good 
faith negotiations between states and tribes.276  Casino-style gaming in 
most states required the negotiation of a compact between the state and 
the specific tribe.277  IGRA gave most of the regulatory authority to the 
tribes but provided substantial oversight through the National Indian 
Gaming Commission, a federal agency.278  IGRA shows that states have 
the political wherewithal within our constitutional democracy to marshal 
forces to secure federal legislation if and when they are unhappy with a 
judicial decision of the Supreme Court.  In contrast, tribes do not have 
political representation in Congress.279 
Accordingly, the existing federal statutes governing tribal bonds, 
when considered in light of the competing interests of tribes, states, and 
the federal government, should preempt state income taxes.  If states are 
unhappy with a judicial decision that confirms this result, then they have 
ready access to Congress and can argue for remedial legislation as they 
did after the Court decided the Cabazon case. 
V. INFRINGEMENT OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
When Indian preemption is involved, state infringement of tribal 
sovereignty is a factor that the courts consider as part of the process of 
weighing tribal, federal, and state interests.280  Infringement became part 
 
 272. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1987), superseded 
by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (2006), (stating that unregulated bingo is a misdemeanor under CAL. 
PEN. CODE ANN. 326.5 (West Supp. 1987)). 
 273. See id. at 209-11. 
 274. See id. at 222. 
 275. See KATHRYN R. L. RAND AND STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, INDIAN GAMING LAW AND 
POLICY 29-33 (2006) (providing a brief overview of the political responses to Indian gaming after 
the decision in Cabazon). 
 276. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2006). 
 277. See id. 
 278. See id. at § 2704-09. 
 279. See Taylor, supra note 126, at 885-87 (describing the lack of political representation that 
tribes have in Congress). 
 280. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). 
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of the preemption analysis in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission,281 when Justice Thurgood Marshall explained that state 
infringement of tribal sovereignty should be a contextual backdrop 
within which the preemption analysis takes place.282  After McClanahan, 
it was not entirely clear whether state infringement of tribal sovereignty 
could be an independent basis for blocking a state action that affected a 
tribe, its members, or an activity taking place within a tribe’s reservation 
boundaries.283 
State infringement of tribal sovereignty, at least as a theoretical 
matter, does remain a separate and independent bar to the exercise of 
state authority within Indian country.284  The United States Supreme 
Court made this quite clear in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw 
Nation.285  In that case, the Chickasaw Nation contended that language 
in one of its treaties, which operated as federal law under the Supremacy 
Clause of the federal Constitution, preempted Oklahoma’s state income 
tax on tribal members who worked for the tribe but who lived off the 
reservation in Oklahoma.286  Justice Ginsburg interpreted the text of the 
particular treaty as having no preemptive effect287 and, therefore, was 
unwilling to bar the imposition of the state income tax in the absence of 
federal legislation that could be read as providing some form of implied 
preemption under the Indian preemption doctrine.288  Of critical 
importance for purposes of the present discussion, Justice Ginsburg 
noted that the state income tax could be barred by application of the 
infringement test.289  Her opinion, however, indicated that the issue was 
not raised below or in the case before the Supreme Court.290  As a result, 
consideration of infringement in the Chickasaw Nation case would have 
been improper.291 
 
 281. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
 282. See id. at 172. 
 283. See Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142 (indicating that infringement is a test separate from 
preemption). 
 284. See id. 
 285. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
 286. See id. at 465. 
 287. See id. at 466 (“We do not read the Treaty as conferring super-sovereign authority to 
interfere with another jurisdiction's sovereign right to tax income, from all sources, of those who 
choose to live within that jurisdiction's limits.”). 
 288. See id. at 465 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973), 
which stated that Indians going beyond their own boundaries subject themselves to state taxation in 
the absence of federal law preempting that taxation). 
 289. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 464 (1995).  
 290. See id. 
 291. See id. at n.14. 
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So when does infringement come into play?  When does the 
exercise of state authority so infringe a tribe’s right to self-government 
that the state action is rendered invalid?  From the decided cases, I 
conclude that impermissible infringement almost never provides a basis 
for invalidating the exercise of state authority affecting a tribe.  The 
infringement test is often not asserted because the Indian preemption 
doctrine provides a sufficient basis for evaluating the propriety of a state 
exercising its authority.  In part, this explains why few cases actually ask 
and answer the infringement question. 
In this article, I assert that the infringement test has been operating 
as an unarticulated prong of judicial analysis in dealing with direct state 
taxation of tribes and their members when engaged in on-reservation 
activity.  It is important to recall that federal case law uniformly holds 
that direct state taxation of a tribe or its members for activity within 
Indian country is categorically barred.292  The only additional refinement 
of this principle is legal incidence.293  So, if we assume that the legal 
incidence of a tax falls on a tribe or one of its members for activity on 
the reservation, then the state tax is invalid.  The Supreme Court, even 
though it has recognized this principle in numerous cases, has never 
provided a rationale for this categorical tribal immunity from state 
taxation.  The Court’s unstated rationale must be infringement.  The 
Court is recognizing that state taxation of a tribe or its members for 
activity undertaken within Indian country would infringe the tribe’s 
sovereignty and prevent it from or impede it in enacting and enforcing 
its own laws. 
We can locate infringement analysis as a subtext of tribal immunity 
from state taxation in a line of cases starting with the Kansas Indians 
 
 292. See id. at 458 (concluding that a state cannot tax tribes or their members for on-
reservation activity unless authorized by Congress); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & 
Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992) (finding that states have no power to tax 
reservations lands); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (holding that Itasca County in 
Minnesota could not impose its property tax on a tribal member’s mobile home located on the 
reservation); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 
475-81 (1976) (prohibiting the imposition of Montana’s cigarette excise tax on sales by on-
reservation smoke shops to tribal members); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 
164, 165-66 (1973) (ruling that Arizona could not impose its income tax on the wages earned by a 
member of the Navajo Nation who lived and worked on the reservation); New York Indians, 72 
U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 764 (1866) (finding tribal lands immune from New York property taxes until the 
rights of possession of the tribe have been extinguished through a lawful treaty); Kansas Indians, 72 
U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 757 (1866) (holding that a Kansas county could not impose its property tax on 
property owned by a Shawnee tribal member owning the property under an allotment provided by 
treaty).   
 293. See Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458-62. 
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and ending with Wagnon.  In the Kansas Indians case, the Court stated 
that as “long as the United States recognizes [the tribe’s] national 
character . . . their property is withdrawn from” the state’s power to 
tax.294  The Court’s focus on the tribe’s national character undoubtedly 
recognizes the principle that tribes are self-governing political 
communities.  The Court uses similar language in The New York Indians 
case showing the recognition of political separation.295  The concern 
about a tribe’s sovereignty becomes explicit in McClanahan:  
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it 
provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it 
provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal 
statutes must be read. It must always be remembered that the various 
Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that 
their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own 
Government.296 
This quote from McClanahan shows that the starting and ending 
point is the tribe’s aboriginal sovereignty: its right to exist as a political 
community governed, as much as possible, by laws of its own making.  
The Wagnon Court, even though it refused to apply the Bracker 
balancing test,297 nonetheless conceded that in different circumstances 
the tribal interest would have to be considered, even if the legal 
incidence of the tax did not fall on the tribe or a tribal member.298   
Unfortunately, state income taxation of interest paid to bond 
owners of tribal bonds is not a tax whose legal incidence falls on the 
tribe.  Therefore, the line of cases just discussed does not provide clear 
precedent supporting a bar against state income taxation.  Such a 
categorical bar would arise if the owner of a tribal bond was another 
tribe.  In such a case, the legal incidence of the state income tax falls on 
the tribe and most courts probably would conclude that most of the 
transaction takes place within Indian country.  For purposes of this 
article, I am assuming that the tribal bond owner is a non-Indian living in 
a state with an income tax that applies to interest income on bonds. 
 
 294. Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 757. 
 295. See New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 764 (recognizing the tribe’s “original rights” 
and entitlement to “undisturbed enjoyment” of their lands). 
 296. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172-73. 
 297. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 99 (2005).  The Bracker 
balancing test derives from the case of White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 
(1980).  In Bracker the Court entered into a “particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, 
federal, and tribal interests at stake” to determine whether a state tax imposed on a non-Indian for 
activity within the White Mountain Apache reservation was subject to state taxation.  See id. at 145. 
 298. See Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 102.  
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But if we unpack the infringement subtext from the tribal tax 
immunity cases, then we see that the United States Supreme Court does 
have some concern about the exercise of state power affecting the 
operation of tribal government.  The Court seems to be assuming that 
Chief Justice John Marshall was correct that the power to tax is the 
power to destroy.299  Accordingly, tribes deserve protection from the 
state’s taxing power, and the United States Supreme Court, in the 
absence of any treaty language or federal statute, has been willing to 
provide this protection.300  If states could tax tribes, then they could 
destroy them.  For example, state property taxation would likely 
bankrupt many tribes with sizable reservations and would impose, in 
many cases, an impossible financial burden on many of their members. 
Noting this judicial concern for protecting tribal governments in the 
making and administration of their laws, we can now look at the process 
of tribal borrowing and its connection with the operation of their 
governments.  Perhaps looking first at federal and state borrowing will 
place the matter in a proper perspective.  The federal and state 
governments could not operate without the power to borrow money.301  
In early 2009, the national debt of the United States stood at more than 
$10.7 trillion.302  This represents about 75 percent of the country’s gross 
domestic product for 2008303 and about 428 percent of total tax revenues 
for the fiscal year 2008.304  If and when Congress fails to increase the 
ceiling on the national debt, then federal government shutdowns become 
a real possibility.  The total debt of the states was estimated to be $2.2 
 
 299. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 431 (1819). 
 300. See, e.g., supra notes 297-98 and text. 
 301. It is no coincidence that the grant in the Constitution of the power to tax is followed by the 
power to “borrow money on the credit of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
 302. See Treasury Direct, The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It, 
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np. 
 303. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, News release: Gross 
Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2008 (Advance), BEA 09-02, at table 3, 
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2009/txt/gdp408a.txt  (giving an advance current 
dollar GDP figure of $14.3 trillion). With a February 2009 national debt of $10.7 trillion and a 2008 
current dollar GDP of $14.3 trillion, the national debt as a percentage of GDP calculates out at 75 
percent (10.7 divided by 14.3 = 74.8 percent).   
 304. Congressional Budget Office, Historical Tables: Revenue, Outlays, Surpluses, Deficits, 
and Debt Held by the Public, 1969-2008 (2009), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9957/ 
Historicaltables09-web.XLS (showing total 2008 federal revenues of $2.5 trillion). With a February 
2009 national debt of $10.7 trillion and total 2008 federal revenues of $2.5 trillion, the national debt 
is 428 percent of total federal revenues (10.7 divided by 2.5 = 428 percent).     
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trillion as of 2005-06.305  Many state and local governments view their 
power to borrow money to be an indispensable tool in accomplishing 
core governmental functions.306 
Governments as borrowers must pay interest on the money they 
borrow.  The interest that the lender earns as the owner of a federal or 
state bond is income.307  But the federal and state governments quickly 
learned that lenders would accept lower rates of interest if the bond 
interest was exempt from income tax.308  The practice of the federal 
government is quite interesting.  Congress has long provided that interest 
earned by lenders to the federal government is exempt from state income 
tax.309  Congress has not provided an exemption for federal income tax 
purposes primarily because higher interest income paid just comes back 
to the federal government through higher income tax revenues.310 
State governments have insisted on exemption from the federal 
income tax from the very beginning.311  The potential federal income 
taxation of municipal bond interest became a sticking point in the 
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.312  Congress has never seriously considered repealing this 
 
 305. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, State & Local Government 
Finances by Level of Government and by State: 2005-06, http://www.census.gov/govs/ 
estimate/0600ussl_1.html (July 1, 2008).  
 306. See, e.g., Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of State Treasurers as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 11, Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 
2088645.  In this brief, the National Association of State Treasurers asserted: 
The authority of States to borrow money, like the authority to raise revenues through 
taxation, is a core aspect of State sovereignty. State and local governments must have 
access to capital markets in order to carry out their essential function of protecting and 
promoting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. By issuing municipal bonds, 
States and their political subdivisions are able to raise funds for costly projects that 
benefit State citizens over extended periods of time without having to depend entirely on 
tax revenues. In the absence of municipal bonds, many important State and local 
government initiatives would have to be delayed or cancelled.  
Id. 
 307. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2006). 
 308. See supra notes 1-6 and text. 
 309. See 31 U.S.C. § 3124 (2006) (providing that interest on federal obligations is exempt from 
state taxation).  This provision originates from the time of the Civil War.  See Act of Feb. 25, 1862, 
12 Stat. 345, 346, ch. 33, § 2 (prohibiting state taxation of “federal stocks, bonds, and other 
securities”).  
 310. In the case of U.S. Savings Bonds, the interest income is deferred, not exempt.  See I.R.C. 
454(a) (2006). 
 311. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 758, ch. 463, § 4. 
 312. See Arthur A. Ekrirch, Jr., The Sixteenth Amendment: The Historical Background, 1 CATO 
JOURNAL 161, 175-76 (1981) (describing the opposition of Charles Evans Hughes, then Governor of 
New York, to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, on the grounds that the federal income 
tax would impair the borrowing capacity of states and local government and also describing New 
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exemption, although it has allowed limited federal income taxation of 
private activity bonds313 through the federal alternative minimum tax.314  
State governments, in order to encourage investment in their bonds, have 
long denied state income tax exemption for out-of-state municipal 
bonds.315  And, as already noted, this practice in Kentucky led two 
Kentucky taxpayers to challenge the practice on grounds that 
discriminatory state income taxation violated the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.316  In the Davis case, the Supreme Court, relying on the 
importance borrowing plays for the operation of government, allowed 
Kentucky’s discriminatory practice of taxing out-of-state bonds and 
exempting in-state bonds.317  Interestingly, the Court did not focus on the 
importance of Kentucky’s taxing power as applied to interest on out-of-
state bonds precisely because the intent of the Kentucky tax law was to 
encourage Kentucky residents to purchase in-state bonds.318  In addition, 
sister states supported Kentucky’s position.319  And finally, although not 
noted by the Court, Congress has not enacted any federal legislation 
dealing with this wide-spread tax discrimination practiced by 41 
states.320 
Given the importance of borrowing to most governments, including 
tribal governments, it is safe to conclude that tribal borrowing of money 
is a core governmental function.  State taxation of interest on tribal 
bonds increases the cost of tribal borrowing.  Every dollar of state 
income tax collected on tribal bond interest increases the cost of 
borrowing for the tribe by about $1.321  The fiscal effect of this cost 
flows directly to governmental operation because the government 
issuing the bond must pay this higher interest rate.  The federal law 
providing the federal exemption requires that the proceeds of tribal 
bonds be used only for the performance of an “essential governmental 
 
York’s initial rejection of the amendment); STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS: LINCOLN 
TO WILSON—THE FIERCE BATTLES OVER MONEY AND POWER THAT TRANSFORMED THE NATION  
256-59 (2002) (describing how the opposition of Charles Evans Hughes in 1910 made ultimate 
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment doubtful).   
 313. For the definition of private activity bonds, see I.R.C. § 141(a) (2006). 
 314. See I.R.C. § 57(a)(5) (2006). 
 315. See Dep’t. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1805-06 (2008). 
 316. See id. at 1807. 
 317. See id. at 1810. 
 318. See id. at 1826-27 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 319. See id. at 1807 n.7. 
 320. See Dep’t. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1807 n.7 (2008). 
 321. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 148 (explaining how the tax exemption operates as a 
subsidy; contrariwise, the absence of a subsidy increases the rate of interest and a tribe’s cost of 
borrowing). 
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function.”322  As a matter of federal law, the tribal bond transaction, by 
definition, connects to the performance of core governmental functions. 
Given the federal and state context in which governmental 
borrowing is a core function and the federal law restricting spending of 
tribal bond proceeds to essential governmental functions, it becomes 
clear that state income taxation of tribal bond interest infringes a tribe’s 
right to self-government.  In this sense, then, direct state taxation of a 
tribe, which the Supreme Court has found to be categorically improper, 
is really no different, as a matter of substance, from direct state taxation 
of tribal borrowing.  Outside of the tribal context, state and federal 
taxation of governmental borrowing reveals the political reality that 
income taxation of bond interest directly affects the cost of borrowing.  
Accordingly, Congress provides a federal income tax exemption for 
interest on municipal bonds323 and imposes a federal prohibition against 
state income taxation of interest on federal borrowing.324  The 
federal/state dynamic has reached a point of political accommodation 
precisely because the structure of Congress as a democratic institution 
includes representation of the political interests of states.325  As I already 
discussed in the preceding section, if federal law provides no ready or 
obvious answer to a question involving the limits of state authority 
within Indian country, then it is appropriate for a federal court to adopt a 
judicial approach that decides the case in favor of the tribal interest.326  If 
the decision is a mistake or stimulates a federal legislative response, then 
the states are in a position to look after their own interests in Congress.  
Tribes, on the other hand, have no institutional place at the political 
table.  Fortunately, the process of most federal legislation includes 
congressional hearings at which tribal representatives can express their 
views.  Of course, they often lack the political power to carry them out.  
But when their views have the weight of fairness and reason behind 
them, the final federal legislation may incorporate these views.327 
In summary, judicial protection of tribal sovereignty and self-
government through a robust infringement doctrine accommodates the 
often conflicting tribal, state, and federal interests.  Tribes should receive 
the highest level of judicial protection because the historical forces of 
 
 322. See I.R.C. § 7871(c)(1) (2006). 
 323. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
 324. See 31 U.S.C. § 3124 (2006). 
 325. See Taylor, supra note 126, at 885-90 (discussing how the constitutional and political 
structures further the representation of states’ interests in Congress but not those of tribes). 
 326. See discussion supra accompanying notes 175-279. 
 327. See Taylor, supra note 126, at 888-89 (discussing this process in the context of Congress’ 
enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act). 
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dispossession have left them with no institutional voice within our 
constitutional framework.  States, in contrast, have political 
representation in Congress through the Senate.  In addition, most 
members of the House of Representatives come from backgrounds in 
which they served as elected or appointed positions at the state or local 
level.328  Quite starkly, no former governmental official from a federally 
recognized Indian tribe serves in Congress.329  Finally, Congress has 
plenary power over Indian affairs and is, therefore, well situated to 
adjust, modify, reverse, or confirm judicial actions that use the 
infringement doctrine to protect tribes from the exercise of state and 
local governmental powers.330 
In the case of tribal bonds, state taxation of the interest income 
extracts close to a dollar for dollar cost to the tribes.  The United States 
Supreme Court in Davis has confirmed that the borrowing function of a 
state or local government is so crucial and important that discriminatory 
state taxation of out-of-state bonds does not violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.331  So why should we permit state income taxation of 
out-of-state bonds, but not permit state income taxation of tribal bonds?  
Posing the question this way in the context of the infringement doctrine 
suggests that my application of the doctrine is inconsistent and illogical.  
My position is logical, however, if we recognize two things.  First, 
states, as I have already explained, have an institutional place in 
Congress where unwanted discrimination can be remedied through 
explicit federal legislation passed under the Interstate Commerce Clause.  
Second, states, at least most of them, have economies that are large 
enough to provide investors for their own bonds.  In contrast, most tribes 
would not have an investor base sufficient to provide buyers for their 
bonds.  In addition, most states have an income tax, but no tribes, at least 
as far as I know, have an income tax.  Consequently, tribal members 
living on the reservation would receive no tribal income tax incentive 
from buying a tribal bond.  Admittedly, the federal incentive would still 
apply.  Nonetheless, the average tribe finds itself in a wholly different 
set of fiscal and economic circumstances than does the average state.  
Therefore, it makes perfect sense that states should not be able to impose 
their income tax on interest from tribal bonds while at the same time 
taxing interest on bonds issued by sister states.   
 
 328. See Representative Offices, United States House of Representatives, 111th Congress, 1st 
Session, http://www.house.gov/house/MemberWWW.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2009). 
 329. See id. 
 330. S.D. v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998). 
 331. Ky. Dept. of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810-11 (2008). 
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VI. THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Under the Constitution, Congress is granted the power to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes.”332  The Supreme Court has viewed this language as 
creating three separate grants of power to Congress.  As a matter of 
textual analysis, the Court refers to the powers as located within 1) the 
Interstate Commerce Clause,333 2) the Foreign Commerce Clause,334 and 
3) the Indian Commerce Clause.335  If and when Congress exercises its 
power in one of these spheres, the federal legislation may explicitly or 
impliedly preempt state law.  In the context of the Indian preemption 
doctrine discussed above, I observed that Congress has not explicitly 
preempted state income taxation of interest on tribal bonds.336  I asserted, 
however, that the Indian preemption doctrine provides a broad sweep in 
which a federal legislative presence justifies a balancing of the 
respective interests.  After balancing those interests, I concluded that the 
Indian preemption doctrine should prohibit state income taxation of 
interest paid on tribal bonds.337 
In this part of the discussion, I investigate whether the Indian 
Commerce Clause is like the Interstate Commerce Clause, and whether 
the negative implications of the Indian Commerce Clause might prohibit 
state income taxation that discriminates against tribal bonds in favor of 
in-state bonds.  I conclude that there is a dormant prong within the 
Indian Commerce Clause.    
The Dormant Commerce Clause is a judicial add-on to the 
Interstate Commerce Clause contained in the United States 
Constitution.338  The text of the clause itself provides Congress with the 
power to regulate commerce “among the several States.”  Consequently, 
the Dormant Commerce Clause comes into play only when Congress has 
 
 332. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 333. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988) (emphasizing that 
the dormant part of the interstate commerce clause is focused on preventing states from engaging in 
economic protectionism). 
 334. See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the Supreme 
Court “has read the Foreign Commerce Clause as granting Congress sweeping powers.”). 
 335. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
177 (1980) (Rehnquist, J, concurring/dissenting) (noting that the Indian Commerce Clause is 
separate and prohibits discriminatory state taxation).  
 336. See discussion supra at notes 175-91. 
 337. See discussion supra at notes 175-279. 
 338. See New Energy Co. of Ind., 486 U.S. at 273–74 (1988) (emphasizing that the dormant 
part of the Interstate Commerce Clause is focused on preventing states from engaging in economic 
protectionism). 
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not undertaken legislation that actually regulates interstate commerce.  
In such cases, the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from 
undertaking actions that unduly burden339 or discriminate against 
interstate commerce.340  In general, the goal of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause is to prohibit states from undertaking measures that constitute 
economic protectionism.341  In the context of taxation, the Dormant 
Commerce Clause generally prohibits states from taxing in a way that 
creates an undue burden on, or that discriminates against, interstate 
commerce.342 
Within the Indian Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court ultimately 
rejected the undue burden analysis in cases involving simultaneous tribal 
and state taxation but recognized a problem when state taxation 
discriminated against a tribe or a tribal interest.  In Washington v. 
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, the Court 
rejected the undue burden approach where the sale of cigarettes within a 
tribe’s reservation was subject to both a state tax and a tribal tax.343  The 
Court, however, recognized that states could not impose their taxes in a 
way that discriminated against tribes.344  In a concurring/dissenting 
opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Indian Commerce Clause, by 
implication, prohibits “discriminatory state action.”345 
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, an oil and gas lessee 
contested the validity of a tribal severance tax imposed on the lessee’s 
mineral extraction activities.346  The lessee asserted, among other things, 
that the tribal tax, when combined with the state tax, was invalid as an 
undue burden on interstate commerce.347  The Court briefly discussed 
the difference between the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian 
Commerce Clause.348  The Court observed that the Indian Commerce 
Clause has a dormant side that serves “as a shield to protect Indian tribes 
 
 339. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (stating that in the absence of 
discrimination, a state law will be upheld, against the dormant Commerce Clause, “unless the 
burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”). 
 340. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (stating that a discriminatory 
state law affecting interstate commerce is usually invalid). 
 341. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988). 
 342. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995). 
 343. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157 
(1980). 
 344. See id. 
 345. See id. at 177. 
 346. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 136 (1982).  
 347. See id. 
 348. See id. at 153-54.  
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from state and local interference.”349  Because the question here involved 
the power of the tribe to tax, the Court found that the dormant Indian 
Commerce Clause was inapplicable.350  Instead, the Court applied its 
Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence and found that Congress had 
acted affirmatively in this case by providing a statutory and regulatory 
regime that included federal approval of the tribal tax.351  The Court 
went on to consider whether the tribal tax, assuming no federal action, 
would have survived dormant Interstate Commerce Clause scrutiny.  The 
Court concluded that the tribal tax satisfied the dormant Commerce 
Clause test352 laid out in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.353  
Specifically, the Court found that the tribal tax did not discriminate 
against interstate commerce.354 
In Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, the United States 
Supreme Court again considered whether multiple taxation by a state 
and a tribe on the same transaction constituted an undue burden on 
interstate commerce in violation of the Indian Commerce Clause.355  
Cotton Petroleum involved mineral extraction from lands on the Jicarilla 
Indian Reservation356 and served to test the validity of state taxation in 
the same factual context as the Merrion case.  In Cotton Petroleum, the 
Court relied on the Colville case357 and rejected the multiple-burden 
argument because the New Mexico severance tax was non-
discriminatory.358 The New Mexico tax applied to all oil and gas 
produced within the state, whether from Indian or non-Indian lands, and 
whether consumed in-state or exported out of state.359  The Court, 
however, indicated that a discriminatory tax would be another matter.360  
The Court suggested that a discriminatory state tax, one that applied to 
tribal wells and not to wells located off the reservation, would be invalid 
 
 349. See id. 
 350. See id. at 154. 
 351. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 155 (1982). 
 352. See id.  
 353. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (allowing a state tax 
on interstate commerce if there is nexus, fair apportionment, and no discrimination). 
 354. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 157-58 (1982).  The Court addressed 
the issue of whether multiple taxation was an undue burden in footnote 26 of its opinion and 
suggested that a state tax might violate the Interstate Commerce Clause as unduly burdensome if the 
level of state taxation “is more than the State’s contact with the [taxed] activity would justify.” Id. 
 355. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
 356. See id. at 167. 
 357. See id. at 188 (citing Colville as implicitly allowing simultaneous tribal and state taxation 
on the same activity). 
 358. See id. at 189. 
 359. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 189 (1989). 
 360. See id.  
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as a violation of the Indian Commerce Clause.361  This analysis in Cotton 
Petroleum suggests that the Indian Commerce Clause does have a 
limited negative implication in cases when state taxation discriminates 
against the tribe or its interests. 
Simple fairness requires that the Indian Commerce Clause should 
provide this protection against discriminatory state taxation.  If we look 
at these two cases in which state taxation was permitted within Indian 
country, it is obvious that discriminatory state taxation would have been 
unfair and would have violated Indian Commerce Clause principles.  In 
Colville and Cotton Petroleum, for example, the Court would have found 
the state taxes invalid as a violation of the Indian Commerce Clause if 
those taxes had applied only on the reservation or at a higher rate for on-
reservation transactions.  This shows that there is actually a dormant 
Indian Commerce Clause because the rationale in both cases was based 
on the conclusion that Congress had passed no laws otherwise 
implicating application of the Indian preemption doctrine. Instead, the 
Court in both cases stated that discriminatory state taxation would 
violate the Indian Commerce Clause.362  In addition, the Court in 
Merrion, as a matter of fundamental principle in federal Indian law, 
stated that the Indian Commerce Clause operates to protect tribes from 
the exercise of state power.363 
In the context of tribal bonds, state income tax rules that allow an 
exemption only for in-state bonds discriminate against tribal bonds 
issued within the state or by tribes located out-of-state.  This is a case of 
simple discrimination in which a state taxes interest on all tribal bonds 
but provides an exemption for interest on its own bonds.  The presence 
of discrimination is factually obvious and therefore violates the dormant 
Indian Commerce Clause.364   
The Davis case, however, permits discriminatory state taxation 
against out-of-state bonds by placing the in-state tax preference within 
the governmental function exception.365  Under this exception, 
 
 361. See id. at 186 (distinguishing its holding from precedent by stating, “This is not a case in 
which the State has had nothing to do with the on-reservation activity, save tax it. Nor is this a case 
in which an unusually large state tax has imposed a substantial burden on the Tribe.” Id.) 
 362. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157 
(1980).  See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989). 
 363. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 153-54 (1982). 
 364. For the leading article asserting that there is a dormant Indian Commerce Clause, see 
Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055 (1995) 
(challenging the correctness of Cotton Petroleum and providing a detailed historical argument in 
favor of a dormant Indian Commerce Clause). 
 365. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008). 
50
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 25 [2010], Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol25/iss1/3
TAYLOR_MACRO.DOC 3/15/2010 11:30 AM 
2010] THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING INTEREST 173 
discrimination against interstate commerce is permitted when the 
activity involves the exercise of a core governmental function.366  The 
Court sees governmental borrowing and the use of borrowed funds as a 
core governmental function.367  The Court then sees the in-state tax 
preference as a permissible method of facilitating this borrowing 
function.368  In support of its reasoning, the Court points to the long and 
pervasive history of virtually all states engaging in discriminatory 
taxation and the failure of a single state to oppose the discriminatory 
practice through the filing of an amicus curie brief in the case.369  The 
Court also notes that Congress seemed aware of the practice but was 
unwilling to step in to provide a legislative remedy.370 
In the context of tribal bonds, does the Davis case provide a ready 
answer to state income taxes that discriminate against interest on tribal 
bonds?  The dormant Interstate Commerce Clause is no longer a 
problem because the Court has placed the in-state tax preference within 
the governmental function exception.371  The dormant Indian Commerce 
Clause, however, does remain a problem precisely because Colville and 
Cotton Petroleum acknowledge that it probably prohibits discriminatory 
state taxation.372  Both Colville and Cotton Petroleum were cases where 
the validity of the state tax involved reservations located wholly within 
the state imposing its tax.373  In the case of tribal bonds, the state income 
tax will apply to in-state tribal bonds and to out-of-state tribal bonds.  
For example, if a tribe within New York issues bonds and one tribal 
bond owner is a resident of New York and another of Minnesota, then 
the two situations present substantially different cases.   
First, let us consider the New Yorker.  The New Yorker who owns 
a tribal bond from a tribe located within New York would be subject to 
the New York income tax.  This tax would discriminate against the tribal 
bond solely because the issuer is a tribe.  If a city or county within New 
 
 366. See id. at 1811. 
 367. See id. at 1810. 
 368. See id. at 1811. 
 369. See id. at 1815-16. 
 370. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1819 (2008). 
 371. See id. 
 372. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157 
(1980); see Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989). 
 373. Colville, 447 U.S. 134 nn. 12-14 (“The Colville Reservation encompasses 1.3 million 
acres in the north-eastern section of Washington . . . . The Lummi Reservation encompasses 7,319 
acres, most of them on a peninsula near Bellingham, Wash. . . . . The Makah Reservation 
encompasses 28,000 acres at the northwest tip of the Olympic Peninsula.”); Cotton Petroleum, 490 
U.S. at 166 (“All 742,135 acres of the Jicarilla Apache Reservation are located in northwestern New 
Mexico.”). 
51
Taylor: The Importance of Being Interest: Why a State Cannot Impose Its I
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
TAYLOR_MACRO.DOC 3/15/2010 11:30 AM 
174 AKRON TAX JOURNAL [25:123 
York located right next to the tribe issued its own bond, then the in-state 
bond would be exempt from the New York income tax.  Except for the 
presence of a discriminatory state tax, these hypothetical facts are very 
close to the facts in Colville and Cotton Petroleum, cases in which the 
Court seemed rather firm in its commitment to protect the tribes from 
discriminatory state taxation. 
On New York’s side, the state could still argue, as Kentucky did in 
Davis, that state and local borrowing is a core governmental function 
that can be promoted through the granting of a tax exemption for in-state 
bonds.  New York would need to argue that the tribe, although 
physically located within the state, is politically separate from the state 
and has sufficient and independent sovereignty to borrow its own funds, 
just like a sister state.  In fact, New York could contend that the federal 
law granting federal income tax exemption for interest on tribal bonds 
reclassifies the tribe as a state in order to create the exemption.  On its 
side, the tribe’s best argument would be that the dormant Indian 
Commerce Clause is designed to protect tribes from the exercise of state 
powers that harm the tribe’s sovereignty.  New York income taxation of 
the interest on the tribal bond directly increases the tribe’s borrowing 
costs and adversely affects the exercise of a core governmental function: 
borrowing money.  In addition, the tribe could argue that it, like almost 
all other tribes, lacks the economic base of individual states sufficient to 
sell bonds to resident tribal members.  Finally, the tribe could assert that 
its bond issue, along with other tribal bond issues, is such a small part of 
the tax-exempt bond market that it would not adversely affect New 
York’s cost of borrowing.  
Switching now to the Minnesotan who buys a tribal bond from a 
New York tribe, we see that Colville and Cotton Petroleum lose their 
factual similarity.  Here, Minnesota could argue that it is treating all out-
of-state governmental bonds the same by subjecting their interest income 
to the state income tax.  Under this line of argument, the Supreme Court 
might very well find that the dormant Indian Commerce Clause does not 
apply because there is no discrimination, except in the case of tribes 
located within Minnesota.374  Nonetheless, the tribe in New York could 
still show discrimination, but the Court would likely draw a parallel to 
the Davis case. 
 
 374. See MINN. STAT. § 290.01(19a)(1)(iii) (2008) (treating bonds issued by tribes located 
within Minnesota the same as in-state bonds).   
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The Davis case, however, should not extend to out-of-state tribal 
bonds precisely because tribes are not states.375  Tribes, unlike states, 
lack representation in Congress.376  Tribes do not impose income taxes 
and, therefore, are not in a position to favor their own bonds through an 
income tax exemption.377  No single tribe has an economy as big as the 
state with the smallest economy.378  Because tribes have not had a 
history of bond issuing, they have not been in a position to participate in 
a nation-wide system granting an in-state tax exemption for in-state 
bonds.  Finally, most tribes lack the political representation within states 
to secure equality of treatment as in-state bond issuers.379 
A conclusive resolution of the issue must await a Supreme Court 
decision, remedial federal legislation, or a pro-tribe approach adopted by 
individual states.  
 
 375. Cotton Petroleum emphatically makes this point.  See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New 
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192-93 (1989). 
 376. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383-84 (1896) (finding that subject to Congressional 
authority, the United States Constitution does not apply to strictly internal affairs of the Cherokee 
nation, because it is a “distinct, independent political” community).  Accord, Solis v. Matheson, 563 
F.3d 425, 429-30 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Indian tribes have a special status as sovereigns with limited 
powers. Indian tribes are dependent on, and subordinate to the federal government, yet retain 
powers of self-government.”); United States v. Red Bird, 146 F.Supp. 2d 993, 999 (D.S.D. 2001) 
(stating that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment apply to tribal court 
matters). See also Scott A. Taylor, The Unending Onslaught on Tribal Sovereignty: State Income 
Taxation of Non-member Indians, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 917, 950-54 (2008). 
 377. A rare exception is the Sac and Fox Tribe, which imposes an earnings tax that is similar to 
an income tax.  See Sac and Fox Nation, Tax Commission, http://www.sacandfoxnation-
nsn.gov/dept_deta.htm?id=2453143.61891204 (last visited Sept. 27, 2009); Sac and Fox Nation v. 
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 967 F.2d 1425, 1427 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting the Sac and Fox Nation’s 
imposition of an income tax on its members whose income was also subject to another layer of 
income taxation by Oklahoma). 
 378. This is a reasonable inference to be drawn from 2006 U.S. Census data showing Native 
Americans as the group suffering the highest level of poverty.  See, e.g., Tax Expenditures: 
Available Data are Insufficient to Determine the Use and Impact of Indian Reservation 
Depreciation, GAO Report 08-731, (June 2008): 
Indians continue to experience economic distress and lag behind other groups in the 
United States on key economic indicators, such as employment and median household 
income, as they have for years in the past. For example, according to the 2006 U.S. 
Census information, American Indians’ median household income was about $15,000 
less than the median of all households in the United States. American Indians also had 
the highest poverty rate of all Census ethnic categories, at 26.6 percent. 
Id.at 1 (footnote omitted). 
 379. See Taylor, supra note 125, at 886-87. 
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VII. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
circumscribes a state’s power to engage in racial discrimination.380  So, 
for example, if a state varied its tax rate based on race, then such a tax 
would be unconstitutional unless the state could provide a compelling 
state interest to justify such taxation.381  In the context of tribal bonds, 
states whose income taxation of bond interest discriminates based on the 
in-state/out-of-state distinction should be able to survive constitutional 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the discrimination is not racial but geographical.  
For example, imposing the Wisconsin income tax382 on all bonds issued 
by governmental entities located outside the boundaries of the state does 
not discriminate against tribal bonds as a separate category.  Instead, the 
discrimination is based on the bond issuer’s location outside of 
Wisconsin, whether the issuer is the City of New York or the Navajo 
Nation. 
The problem of racial discrimination, however, does arise for a 
state with an income tax that applies to tribal bonds issued by tribes 
located within that state’s boundaries.  In California, for example, 
exemption from state income taxation extends only to bonds issued by 
the state or by local governments.383  California has more than 100 
federally recognized Indian tribes located within its boundaries.384  Any 
bonds issued by these tribes would be subject to the California income 
tax because that state defines income as all income and specifically 
excludes only interest on bonds issued by the state and by local 
governments.385 
 
 380. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 providing that no state shall “deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
 381. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324-25 (2003) (subjecting race-conscious 
admissions to a state-supported law school to the compelling-state-interest analysis, which 
presumably would apply in the context of state taxation). 
 382. See WIS. STAT. § 71.05(1)(c) (2008) (extending exemption from the Wisconsin income 
tax only for enumerated bonds, all of which must be issued within the state). 
 383. See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17133 (2008) (extending exemption only to bonds issued by 
state and local governments of California). 
 384. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 73 Fed. Reg. 18553-57 (April 4, 2008). 
 385. See Analysis of SB 995: Exemption/Interest On Bonds Issued By Federally Recognized 
Indian Tribal Government Located In This State (California Legislature 2005), 
http://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/legis/05_06bills/sb995_022205.pdf (explaining how the interest from 
tribal bonds issued by in-state tribes are subject to the California income tax).  California never 
enacted this proposed legislation. 
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Precisely stated, is the state income taxation based on the race of 
the tribe issuing the bond?  Arguably, this is the case.  A federally 
recognized Indian tribe is a distinct political entity comprised of 
members.386  Membership in a tribe is a question of tribal self-
determination.387  In general, tribes adopt membership rules as part of 
their law-making process.388  These membership rules usually require 
some genetic connection in the form of blood quantum or ancestry.389  
As a result, one could argue that many or most federally recognized 
Indian tribes are political entities that use race as a qualifying 
characteristic for membership.390  Stated another way, a tribe’s 
membership is very often comprised of Native Americans based on 
some form of ancestral connection.   
Therefore, if a state exempts the interest income of a bond issued 
by one of its cities but refuses a comparable exemption for interest 
income earned on a tribal bond issued by a tribe located geographically 
within the state, then reason for the discrimination is arguably racial.  If 
so, then the state would need a compelling reason to engage in such 
racial discrimination. 
The leading case on racial discrimination involving Native 
Americans is Morton v. Mancari.391  In Mancari, the United States 
Supreme Court decided that a federal hiring preference for Native 
Americans was not unlawful racial discrimination because the 
classification of a person as a Native American was political, not 
racial.392  If we apply the Mancari rationale to state income taxation in 
the tribal bond setting, then we must conclude that the factor justifying 
the discrimination is a political one and not a racial one.  In Mancari, the 
Court concluded that the hiring preference practice was justified by a 
 
 386. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (observing that “Indian nations 
had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original 
natural rights.”). 
 387. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (citing Roff v. Burney, 168 
U.S. 218 (1897), which confirmed that membership decisions were within the exclusive power of 
the tribe). 
 388. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 526-27 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 389. See id. 
 390. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus Political 
Identity Dilemma, 96 CAL. L. REV. 801, 805-6 (2008) (identifying potential equal protection 
problems associated with political classifications based on blood quantum). 
 391. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 392. See id. at n. 24. “The preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of 
‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes.  This operates to 
exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’  In this sense, the preference 
is political rather than racial in nature.” Id. 
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rational purpose.393  Presumably, then, a state could find a rational 
purpose for taxing in-state tribal bonds.  Such a state would have to 
argue that the political separation of the tribe from the state is just as 
clear as the political separation of one state from another.  Accordingly, 
a state can promote its own bonds by not allowing an exemption for 
bonds issued by politically separate tribes. 
The Mancari line of analysis, which focuses on political status and 
not racial status, is somewhat artificial because federally recognized 
Indian tribes are both politically separate and, in many cases, racially 
distinct.  Perhaps it is best to acknowledge the presence of both of these 
two characteristics.  The next step, then, should be to determine whether 
the discriminatory state taxation operates primarily at a political level or 
a racial level.  The Davis case seems to answer the question by noting 
that those states that tax bond interest from bonds issued out-of-state are 
doing so to promote their own in-state bonds.394  The discrimination is 
wholly political and favors the local interest and, therefore, does not 
amount to racial discrimination. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The exercise of a state’s power in a way that adversely impacts the 
sovereignty of a federally recognized Indian tribe has been a matter of 
serious concern to the United States Supreme Court since 1832.395  The 
limit of a state’s power to tax is very often the subject of judicial 
concern.396  In this article, I have investigated the limitations that states 
may face when they impose their income taxes on interest that investors 
earn on bonds issued by federally recognized Indian tribes.  I have 
concluded that such state taxation is barred by the Indian preemption 
doctrine.  The federal legislation that granted exemption for such interest 
for federal income tax purposes has the strength and breadth to preempt 
state income taxation.  State income taxation of interest on tribal bonds 
also infringes tribal sovereignty.  This infringement operates as an 
independent and second bar to state taxation.  A third barrier to state 
taxation is the Indian Commerce Clause.  Case law supports the 
conclusion that states cannot exempt in-state activities while taxing on- 
reservation ones.  The Davis case now allows states to discriminate 
against one another in the taxation of bond income.  But this form of 
 
 393. Id. at 555. 
 394. Ky. Dept. of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810-11 (2008). 
 395. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 396. See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005). 
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discrimination does not and should not apply to federally recognized 
Indian tribes, because they occupy a totally different political and 
economic place in the United States.  Finally, I have concluded that state 
discrimination against tribal bonds does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because tribes are primarily 
political, rather than racial, communities.  Accordingly, a state would 
have a rational purpose for discriminating against tribal bonds in favor 
of its own bonds.  Nonetheless, the Indian preemption doctrine, state 
infringement of tribal sovereignty, and the dormant Indian Commerce 
Clause stand as independent barriers to a state’s power to impose its 
income tax on interest from tribal bonds. 
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